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Compliance with goodwill related mandatory disclosure requirements and the cost of 
equity capital 
 
Abstract 
 
Theory suggests that increased levels of corporate disclosure lead to a decrease in cost of equity 
via the reduction of estimation risk. We examine compliance levels with IFRS 3 and IAS 36 
mandated goodwill related disclosure and their association with firms’ implied cost of equity 
capital (ICC). Using a sample of European firms for the period 2008 to 2011, we find a median 
compliance level of about 83% and significant differences in compliance levels across firms 
and time. Non-compliance relates mostly to proprietary information and information that 
reveals managers’ judgment and expectations. Overall, we find a statistically significant 
negative relationship between the ICC and compliance with mandated goodwill related 
disclosure. Further, we split the sample between firms meeting (or not) market expectations 
about the recognition of a goodwill impairment loss in a given year to study whether variation 
in compliance levels mainly plays a confirmatory or a mediatory role. We find the latter: higher 
compliance levels matter only for the sub-sample of firms that do not meet market expectations 
regarding goodwill impairment. Finally, our results hold only in countries where enforcement 
is strong.  
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1 Introduction 
We test the relationship between firms’ compliance with goodwill related disclosure (as 
mandated by International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 3 Business Combinations and 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 36 Impairments of Assets) and their implied cost of 
equity capital (ICC). We expect it to be negative: a higher degree of compliance should reduce 
estimation risk or parameter uncertainty and, thus, the ICC. Second, we argue that a firm that 
recognises a goodwill impairment loss when not expected to do so (or vice versa) surprises 
investors, leading them to search for new information. Thus, higher compliance with goodwill 
related mandatory disclosure requirements should play a more informative role in these cases. 
Goodwill recognised in a business combination is an asset representing future economic 
benefits arising from expected synergies not individually identified and separately recognised. 
Thus, goodwill conveys current- and forward-looking corporate information. Additionally, by 
definition, goodwill is an asset, the benefits of which, and contribution to a company’s 
estimated future cash flows, are difficult to estimate - especially for someone without inside 
information. The anticipation and estimation of a potential impairment of goodwill is equally 
difficult. To minimise the estimation risk arising from goodwill recognition and measurement, 
IFRS requires firms to disclose specific information to inform users on how and why goodwill 
arises in business combinations. Further, IAS 36 contains disclosure requirements that ‘are 
designed to improve the reliability of the impairment test’ (IAS 36, Basis for conclusions, 
paragraph 198), which is primarily based on managerial assumptions and proprietary 
information. These disclosures include managerial explanations about recognition of an 
impairment, how future cash flows are forecasted, and what discount rates and terminal growth 
assumptions are used. Varying levels of compliance with these requirements impact investors’ 
abilities to better estimate the amount, timing, and uncertainty of an entity’s future net cash 
inflows across firms. This is critical given the ample evidence that analysts do use impairment 
information from the footnotes in their decision-making process (e.g., EY 2010, FRC 2014, 
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KPMG 2014) and that compliance levels with regard to this topic in particular vary substantially 
across firms (ESMA 2013, Glaum et al. 2013). 
We analyse a sample of non-financial constituents from Standard and Poor’s Europe 350 
(S&P EU350) index over a period of four years (2008-2011). We use a disclosure checklist 
consisting of more than 50 items mandated by IFRS 3 and IAS 36, and manually check each of 
our sample firms for compliance. Subsequently, we compute two country-specific disclosure 
scores and one that treats our sample firms as a homogenous group. Then, we employ OLS and 
year fixed effects panel regression techniques, as suggested by Nikolaev and van Lent (2005), 
to identify whether the relationship of these disclosures with ICC is indeed negative, while 
controlling for other factors. We document that the median degree of compliance with goodwill 
related mandatory disclosure is around 83% but we also observe significant differences across 
firms. Further, we find a significant positive trend in compliance scores from 2008 to 2011, 
suggesting that these disclosures vary over time.  
In addition, we examine the specific paragraphs for which we find high non-compliance. 
These paragraphs, inter alia, relate to assumptions and estimations used in the value in use 
calculations needed for making impairment decisions. Differential compliance levels with these 
disclosures across firms are particularly important as these have been shown to have 
information content (Al Jifri and Citron 2009) and relevance in assessing the implementation 
quality of the goodwill impairment tests (Hoogendoorn 2006, Carlin and Finch 2009, 2010, 
Bens et al. 2011, Li et al. 2011, Mazzi et al. 2016). Moreover, a 2014 report of the Accounting 
Standard Board of Japan (ASBJ), the Italian Standards Setter (OIC) and the European Financial 
Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) (ASBJ et al., 2014) indicates that preparers believe that 
these disclosure requirements force their companies to disclose potentially sensitive proprietary 
information.  
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Overall, we find a negative and statistically significant association between compliance 
levels with goodwill related disclosure requirements and ICC. Our analyses across the sub-
samples of companies meeting (or not) market expectations about recognition of goodwill 
impairments reveal that compliance levels are associated with ICC only for firms not meeting 
market expectations. Increased disclosure assists investors in understanding why a firm 
impaired its goodwill (or not) only when this contradicts their expectations: greater compliance 
leads to a reduction of parameter uncertainty about future cash flow estimates. Further, we 
report evidence that these results hold only in countries with high enforcement. 
We contribute to prior research in the following ways. First, we respond to calls for research 
on the economic consequences of disclosures mandated by accounting standards (Bushee and 
Leuz 2005, Leuz and Wysocki 2016), for which evidence is sparse. Prior empirical studies focus 
mainly on information disclosed on a voluntary basis (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee 2002, Hail 
2002, Gietzmann and Ireland 2005, Francis et al. 2008, Dhaliwal et al. 2011, Blanco et al. 2015). 
Yet, compliance levels vary across firms and time, reflecting a likely trade-off between 
litigation costs resulting from non-disclosure (Skinner 1994) and proprietary costs resulting 
from disclosure (Verrecchia 2001). Second, our findings add to the strand of literature asserting 
that information matters depending on users’ expectations. In fact, our results hold only across 
the sub-sample of companies not meeting the market’s expectations about goodwill 
impairments and shed more light on when we might expect benefits from better disclosure, i.e., 
when it is most likely to help with the estimation of future earnings and cash flows. 
Our findings should appeal to regulators who call for academic research to assist in the 
development of more evidence-informed accounting standard-setting (Teixeira 2014) and to 
financial statement preparers who must weigh the cost and benefits of their financial reporting 
choices. The significant differences in the compliance levels we report indicate that regulators 
need to address some deficiencies in the quality of financial reporting even among the largest 
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EU firms. This complements the ‘Summary of research evidence’ within the Feedback 
Statement of the IASB’s IFRS 3 Post Implementation Review (IASB 2015). Moreover, 
reflecting on standard setters’ and regulators’ recent concerns (e.g., EFRAG et al. 2012, FRC 
2012, ESMA 2013, Hoogervorst 2013, IASB 2013) about the usefulness of disclosures required 
by accounting standards, we show those in IFRS 3 and IAS 36 can be important.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
framework and the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection process and 
the research design. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical findings. Section 5 contains 
additional tests and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Goodwill related disclosure and the cost of capital 
There is an ongoing debate as to whether better information (disclosure) leads to lower cost of 
capital (Lambert et al. 2007, Hughes et al. 2007, Lambert et al. 2012, Bertomeu and Cheynel 
2016). One possible channel through which disclosure would reduce cost of capital is via the 
reduction of estimation risk (Botosan 1997). The underlying argument about estimation risk is 
that securities for which less information is available are riskier because of greater uncertainty 
surrounding the exact parameters of their return distribution (Coles et al. 1995, Clarkson et al. 
1996). Thus, higher firm disclosure may reduce estimation risk and cost of capital. This theory, 
however, critically depends on the non-diversifiable nature of information risk (Beyer et al. 
2010). Prior studies examine estimation risk in relation to the cost of capital, considering 
corporate disclosure as a signal of future cash flows changes (e.g., Hughes et al. 2007, Lambert 
et al. 2007, 2012). Corporate disclosure may change a firm’s value by affecting managerial 
decisions, thus altering the distribution of future cash flows (Leuz and Wysocki 2016). For 
example, the covariance between the cash flows of two firms decreases as disclosure in at least 
one of the two increases. Such a covariance decrease reduces the cost of capital, since this 
information effect is non-diversifiable (Lambert et al. 2007).  
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Despite the existence of lengthy disclosure requirements in accounting standards, prior 
empirical studies mostly examine the effects of differential levels of voluntary disclosure (e.g., 
Botosan and Plumlee 2002, Hail 2002, Gietzmann and Ireland 2005, Francis et al. 2008, 
Dhaliwal et al. 2011, Blanco et al. 2015). Evidence regarding the economic consequences of 
compliance with mandatory disclosures remains largely unexplored (Bushee and Leuz, 2005, 
Leuz and Wysocki, 2016), as scholars  make the false assumption that companies fully comply 
with regulated disclosures. Evidence in the accounting literature (e.g., Abdullah et al. 2015; 
Glaum et al. 2013) reveals that this is not true. The existence of a standardised framework with 
which users can easily identify whether a company provides all information required and/or 
which particular pieces of information are absent, however, allows for the exact 
information/item that companies are expected to disclose (and accounting standards mandate) 
to be easily identifiable in specific parts of an annual report. Thus, it would be inappropriate (if 
not misleading) to rely only on evidence referring to the impact of differential levels of 
voluntary disclosure on the cost of capital. Omitted disclosures via non-compliance with 
accounting standards may constitute a correlated omitted variable, leading to biased 
estimations. For this reason, Botosan (2006) calls for additional research that investigates the 
relationship between different types of disclosure and the cost of equity. Likewise, Gietzmann 
and Trombetta (2003, p. 187) state that ‘communication via voluntary disclosure need not be a 
simple substitute for communication via accounting policy choice’ (the latter is part of 
disclosure mandated by accounting standards). Easley and O’Hara (2004) add that the under-
provision of public information is possible without required disclosure, suggesting the 
importance of voluntary disclosure on a firm’s cost of capital being exacerbated if the degree 
of compliance with required disclosure is ignored. 
Theory also suggests that accounting policy disclosure - effectively mandated by 
accounting standards - enables financial statement users to gather information about underlying 
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accounting practices and, consequently, about a firm’s private information (Dye 1985). Hope 
(2003) finds that disclosing accounting policies in an annual report is important to analysts, is 
more useful than other annual report disclosures, and is capable of reducing uncertainty about 
forecasted earnings. Harris and Morsfield (2012) document that virtually all investors and 
analysts who participate in their roundtable discussions and interviews, claim that they 
“extremely” or “very” often require data found only in the footnotes. More closely related to 
our study, findings from an EY (2010) survey indicate that most investors, analysts and lenders 
use impairment information disclosed in financial statements in their investment or lending 
decision-making processes. Similar evidence is reported in surveys conducted by FRC (2014) 
and KPMG (2014). 
Goodwill often represents a significant amount on a company’s balance sheet and has a 
distinct nature. It represents the excess of the purchase price over the acquirer’s interest in the 
fair value of identifiable assets and liabilities acquired as at the day of the transaction. In other 
words, goodwill recognised is an asset that represents future economic benefits arising from 
synergies (that are not individually identified and separately recognised) between the 
identifiable and non-identifiable assets acquired. Thus, it conveys relevant current- and 
forward-looking information. 
Investors are interested in understanding why a company proceeds with a specific 
acquisition (e.g., access to intellectual property, access to markets and/or synergies). Chauvin 
and Hirschey (1994) show that goodwill accounting data offer a useful perspective on the hard-
to-measure ongoing concern (reputational) value component of a firm’s economic value. A 
number of papers show that the recognised value of goodwill itself is value relevant (e.g., 
McCarthy and Schneider 1995, Barth and Clinch 1996, Jennings et al. 1996). More relevant to 
our study, Al Jifri and Citron (2009) investigate both financial statement recognition and note 
disclosure, concluding that both aspects are correlated with share price. Paugam et al. (2015) 
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show that the purchase price allocation is informative. Henning et al. (2000) also find that 
investors attach valuation weights to the identifiable components of purchased goodwill. 
Finally, Lee (2011), Lys et al. (2012) and Chalmers et al. (2012) find that goodwill is linked to 
future performance. Based on the above, we argue that recognised goodwill related disclosure 
conveys valuable information that reduces information risk. 
Another strand of research is focused on the information content of goodwill write-offs 
(e.g., Bens et al. 2011, Li et al. 2011). Li et al. (2011, p. 747) show that investors and financial 
analysts revise their expectations downwards following an impairment loss announcement and 
conclude that ‘the impairment loss thus appears to be a leading indicator of a decline in the 
future profitability’. Hirschey and Richardson (2002) indicate that such losses result in negative 
valuation effects. Disclosure of such losses, however, should be accompanied by important 
information regarding business risks, assumptions used and predictions made in the impairment 
testing. Otherwise, goodwill impairment testing process gives rise to concerns about its 
implementation quality (e.g., opportunistic selection of discount rates used in impairment 
testing: Hoogendoorn 2006, Carlin and Finch 2009, 2010). Indicative of the opportunistic use 
of goodwill impairment is the recent evidence by André et al. (2015) who show cross-sectional 
variation in conditional conservatism linked to goodwill impairment decisions.  
The estimation of the goodwill recoverable amount relies on management expectations 
about the results of future actions driven by firm strategy. Disclosures that shed light on the 
assumptions and estimations considered during the impairment testing should enable financial 
statement users to gather information about firm private information (Dye 1985) and should 
reduce uncertainty about forecasted earnings (Hope 2003). Since real expectations and 
managerial private information are unobservable (Riedl 2004), such information cannot be fully 
verified by external stakeholders, unless managers disclose them. Thus, we further argue that 
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mandated information related to goodwill impairment testing also conveys relevant information 
and reduces information risk. 
Theory also suggests that compliance with disclosures mandated by accounting standards 
forces companies ‘to disclose verifiable fundamentals based on past transactions and events, 
such as cash flows, profits, assets, and liabilities [which] essentially “grounds” expectations, 
making it harder for bubbles to occur’ and facilitating market stability (Leuz and Wysocki 2016, 
p. 600). Mandatory disclosures also bind companies to disclose both good and bad news 
(Verrecchia 2001). This may provide incentives for non-compliance, opposing the expected or 
intended outcomes of accounting regulators: a manager aiming to maximise the firm’s value 
will be reluctant to disclose potentially harmful information for the company’s value (Dye 
1986). Then again, to avoid ‘litigation costs’, a company may comply with mandated 
disclosures, even if they have to disclose proprietary information or bad news (Skinner 1994).  
Even in countries where enforcement is very strong, like the US, non-compliance with 
mandatory disclosure requirements is evident (Robinson et al. 2011, Ayers et al. 2015). Thus, 
managerial incentives are strong and prevail over litigation risks when it comes to disclose 
proprietary information, albeit mandated by accounting standards. Hence, financial statement 
users receive variable levels of mandated information across firms, which can have an impact 
on the firm’s information risk.  
IFRS 3 focuses mainly on positive and negative goodwill that arises in business 
combinations finalised during the financial year. It thus mandates important information 
regarding purchase price allocation, amount of goodwill arising from the business combination 
and a description of factors that make up the goodwill (and/or negative goodwill) recognised, 
resulting in the provision of important signals to the market. IAS 36 mainly relates to the 
allocation of existing goodwill to Cash Generating Units (CGUs) and estimation of its 
recoverable amount. It requires information including cash flow projection periods, growth 
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rates, discount rates and events / circumstances that lead to impairment loss recognition. We 
argue that information mandated by IAS 36 and IFRS 3 related to goodwill conveys relevant 
information to the financial markets and reduces information risk. Based on information risk 
theory that posits an association between the degree of compliance with relevant disclosures 
and the cost of equity capital, we set and test the following directional hypothesis: 
H1: A higher degree of compliance with goodwill-related mandatory disclosure requirements 
is negatively associated with the cost of equity capital.  
 
Investors are also interested in understanding whether a company achieves its original 
objectives with regard to an acquisition. Although an impairment does not affect an entity’s 
current cash flows, being able to predict an impairment is an important input to investors’ 
assessment of the amount, timing and uncertainty of (the prospect for) future net cash inflows. 
If the performance of certain CGUs or individual subsidiaries is deteriorating, users will lower 
their previous future cash flows and returns forecasts.  
Given that market participants seem able to anticipate the recognition of an impairment 
loss (Bens et al. 2011, Ramanna and Watts 2012, Knauer and Wöhrmann 2016), we claim that 
the importance of compliance with goodwill related disclosure differs with whether a firm 
meets this market expectation or not. We predict that the market has a relatively lower 
estimation risk when a firm meets the market’s expectation (i.e., it is expected to impair 
goodwill and does so or it is not expected to impair and does not do so) than when a firm does 
not meet expectations (i.e., does not impair when expected to do so or impairs when not 
expected to do so). We know that investors react more negatively to goodwill impairment 
announcements when an unverifiable explanation by management is provided (Knauer and 
Wöhrmann, 2016). 
We argue that a firm that does not meet the market’s expectation, surprises investors, 
leading them to seek more information. Not meeting the market’s expectation implies 
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potentially less a priori information available about these firms. Thus, higher levels of 
compliance with goodwill related mandatory disclosure have a more important role in shedding 
light on why a firm acts contrary to expectations. When market expectations are not met, 
increased disclosure (via higher compliance) assists in a better understanding of the firm’s 
future returns distribution, reducing estimation risk and in turn, cost of equity capital (Coles et 
al. 1995, Clarkson et al. 1996). Instead, when companies meet market expectations, increased 
disclosure has less value as the market is able to anticipate the recognition or not of an 
impairment loss. We set and test the following directional hypothesis: 
H2: The negative association between the degree of compliance with goodwill related 
mandatory disclosure requirements and the cost of equity capital is higher (lower) for firms 
that do not meet (meet) market expectations with regard to the recognition of a goodwill 
impairment loss.  
 
3 Research design 
3.1 Sample and measurement of goodwill related mandatory disclosure levels 
We use a final sample of 831 firm-year observations, relating to 214 non-financial firms 
included in the S&P EU350 index at least once during 2008 to 2011 (avoiding survivorship bias 
by not requiring firms to be in the index for all years tested). Table 1 summarises the sample 
selection process, the criteria on which firms are selected and the number of observations 
excluded. Table 1 also provides a country-industry classification. Briefly, most sample firms 
are listed in the UK and France and are part of the Industrials, Consumer Services and Consumer 
Goods ICB industry sectors. 
TABLE 1 – ABOUT HERE 
We focus on the disclosures related to goodwill within IFRS 3 and IAS 36.1 We develop a 
disclosure checklist to score compliance for each firm-year. Since 1st July 2009, revised 
                                                 
1 IAS 38 Intangible Assets also requires some information which could be relevant to goodwill. This is already 
contained in IFRS 3. To avoid double counting information required by more than one standard, our checklist is 
designed to include items only from the most relevant standard (Tsalavoutas et al. 2010). 
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versions of IFRS 3 and IAS 36 have come into force, amending mandatory disclosure 
requirements. To account for the differences introduced and to identify the appropriate 
individual disclosure items, we draw up two different checklists: one for the 2008 and 2009 
periods (hereafter, old checklist) and another for the 2010 and 2011 periods (hereafter, new 
checklist).2 We take into consideration the financial year-ends of our sample firms and we make 
sure that the appropriate checklist is used for each year under examination: if the first financial 
year for a company begins after 1st July 2009 (finishes after 30 June 2010), the revised IFRS 3 
and IAS 36 are applicable. Thus, the information captured derives from the new checklist and 
is under the 2010 financial year.  
Within these checklists, first, we only consider goodwill related information that preparers 
are required to provide.3 Second, we exclude information that the standards encourage firms to 
disclose, but disclosure is not mandatory.4 Third, considering that the standards subdivide 
disclosure requirements across many sub-paragraphs, we use the information down to the last 
level of disaggregation.5  
As it is common in this literature (e.g., Cooke 1992, Camfferman and Cooke 2002), we 
establish the content validity6 of the research instrument by adopting the following procedures. 
Both the old and new checklists were initially designed independently by each co-author and a 
first draft was the outcome of reaching consensus among the authors’ lists. Then, the input of 
an independent, experienced, and professionally qualified practitioner was sought to further 
                                                 
2 For example, paragraph 134-e of the revised IAS 36 requires three new pieces of information to be provided for 
fair value measurement if the discounted cash-flow method is used (134-e-iii, 134-e-iv and 134-e-v).  
3 The items we focus on are those listed in the sections ‘Disclosures’ in each standard, are written in bold fonts 
and the sentence ‘an entity (or an acquirer) shall disclose…’ precedes them. 
4 We control for the potential effect of other disclosures on ICC while performing our multivariate analyses.  
5 As an example, Appendix A illustrates how the disaggregation issue is dealt with as regards to the disclosures 
required by IAS 36 paragraph 134 and sub-paragraph d. 
6 Content validity refers to the adequacy of the instrument to measure the concept of interest (disclosure levels in 
this case). Content validity is achieved when a group of expert judges evaluates the items which are supposed to 
measure the concept and ensure that they, in fact, do so. 
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discuss the list. The final old checklist contains 51 items (21 from IFRS 3 and 30 from IAS 36) 
and the new checklist contains 54 items (21 from IFRS 3 and 33 from IAS 36).7  
The process of calculating mandatory disclosure levels for all sample firms is as follows. 
If a required item is disclosed, it is scored as 1 and if not, it is scored as 0. In case an item is not 
applicable to a company, it is scored as ‘not applicable’ (NA) (Cooke 1992). Since only material 
items should be disclosed, applicability is an issue in these types of studies. Further, disclosure 
requirements relate to three aspects: carrying amount of existing goodwill, goodwill impairment 
losses and goodwill arising from a business combination in the current year. We consider these 
aspects/issues in the following way. First, every firm in the sample has goodwill which accounts 
for at least 5% of the book value of shareholders equity, a level that the European Securities 
and Market Authority (i.e., the regulators) considers material (ESMA 2011). Thus, we view all 
goodwill related disclosures as applicable for all our firms. Second, we apply the following 
criteria for ensuring that specific items related to material goodwill impairment losses and 
material business combinations, in particular, are applicable. First, given that recognition of a 
material goodwill impairment loss triggers more disclosures, we consider a material goodwill 
impairment loss to take place if it accounts for more than 5% of goodwill, as at the beginning 
of the year. Second, given that a material business combination triggers further disclosures, we 
consider a business combination to be material if the purchase price accounts for more than 5% 
of the company’s total assets or sales, as at beginning of the year. This threshold also applies to 
business combinations that a firm reports to be individually immaterial but collectively 
material. To avoid penalising a company for not disclosing an item and for ensuring that an 
item is not applicable, we carefully read not only the notes to the financial statements but also 
the whole annual report before scoring this particular item. To ensure that we do not miss any 
                                                 
7 Detailed checklists are available upon request. 
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relevant information, we also scan the electronic version of each annual report, looking for the 
keywords: IAS 36, IFRS 3, business combination, impairment, goodwill, acquisition, negative 
goodwill, and bargain purchase.  
A disclosure index for each company is then calculated as the ratio of the total items 
disclosed to the maximum possible score applicable for that company:  
𝐶𝑗 =
𝑇 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖,𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑀 = ∑ 𝑑𝑖,𝑗
𝑚
𝑖=1
 (1) 
where 𝐶𝑗 is the total compliance score for each company and 0 ≤ 𝐶𝑗 ≤ 1. 𝑇 is the total number 
of items disclosed (𝑑𝑖) by company 𝑗 and 𝑀 is the maximum number of applicable disclosure 
items for company j (and with which compliance is expected) (see Hodgdon et al. 2008, 
Tsalavoutas 2011, Glaum et al. 2013).8  
Prior literature on compliance with mandatory disclosures as well as our own validating 
tests (Appendix B) indicate that a variation in compliance levels is associated inter alia with a 
country’s enforcement mechanisms, legal origin, financial structure and other country specific 
characteristics. Hence, to avoid our score picking up a country effect on ICC, following Francis 
et al. (2005), we derive two country-specific scores for each firm on an annual basis. The first 
metric (DiscScaled) is the difference between a firm’s disclosure and the country-minimum (in 
our sample), scaled by the country-minimum score. This represents a relative percentage 
increase in mandatory disclosure related to goodwill over the country-minimum level in any 
given year. The second metric (DiscRaw) is the company’s score over and above the country-
minimum score the firm is incorporated in (again based on our sample firms). This represents 
the actual increase in compliance at the country level in any given year. These measures capture 
                                                 
8 Tsalavoutas et al. (2010) and Tsalavoutas (2011) discuss the potential benefits of separating the items across 
different standards (in our case, separating across IFRS 3 and IAS 36), by first calculating compliance with each 
grouping and then weighting them equally. This method focuses on compliance with standards (or other groupings 
of disclosure items). We only focus on disclosure items from different standards relating to one particular asset. 
Thus, equal weighting of standards is not relevant for the purposes of this study.  
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the corporate trade-off in a given country between non-disclosure and the proprietary costs the 
company faces by disclosing more. 
In addition, we compute a third measure namely the Saidin index (DiscSaidin) (Hodgdon 
et al. 2008, 2009). As Hodgdon et al. (2009, p. 43) explain, this ‘…index weights each 
disclosure item by the percentage of firms in the sample that do not comply with the item’. We 
employ this alternative measure for two reasons. First, this measure treats all sample firms as a 
homogenous group (it is not country adjusted). Given that our sample firms are the largest in 
the EU and are constituents of the S&P EU350 index, one could argue that they form more of 
a homogeneous group. Second, the primary assumption embodied in this measure is that less 
commonly disclosed items ‘…are more costly and may have greater informational value to 
financial analysts. Less common disclosures, therefore, receive a greater weighting in the Saidin 
index, with the weight approaching one for disclosures that no firm provides. Conversely, a 
disclosure that is less costly or onerous to provide and is provided by all firms would receive a 
weight closer to zero.’ (Hodgdon et al. 2009, p. 43). Thus, the Saidin index can be used as a 
proxy for the proprietary related cost considerations arising from the preparation and 
dissemination of information that may influence managers’ decisions. In line with this, this 
measure also reflects on the concept of materiality as defined by the IASB (i.e., information is 
material if its omission or misstatement could influence the economic decisions of users taken 
on the basis of the financial statements). Given that preparers do perceive these required 
disclosures as costly since they may provide proprietary information, a higher weight within 
the index is justified (considering that they go the extra mile and disclose more compared to 
others – hence they are subject to higher proprietary costs).  
Before splitting the task of checking each firm in the sample against our checklists between 
ourselves, we apply the scoring process described above and we carry out a preliminary pilot 
study on ten randomly selected sample companies. Each one of us scores these ten firms 
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independently. Using a Mann-Whitney test, we confirm that the differences in the compliance 
scores calculated independently are not statistically significant. This process enables us to 
ensure reliable scoring for all the firms in the sample between.  
In line with Botosan (1997), once we compute the disclosure scores for all sample firms, 
we further assess their validity by testing their association with variables identified as 
significant determinants of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements in prior 
relevant literature (i.e., Wallace et al. 1994, Ali et al. 2004, Glaum et al. 2013). The results from 
these tests confirm the validity of our disclosure measures as they are in line with the findings 
of this literature. See Appendix B for details around these tests.  
 
3.2 Cost of equity proxies 
Cost of equity measurement is extensively discussed in the literature. It can be calculated with 
the use of realised returns in an asset pricing model and/or be implied using expected cash flows 
and earnings (ICC). We focus on ICC, as realised returns are a noisy proxy for expected returns 
(e.g., Elton 1999, Fama and French 2002, Easton and Monahan 2016). ICC estimates expected 
returns directly from stock prices and cash flow forecasts without relying on biased realised 
returns or on asset pricing models (Hou et al. 2012). ICC estimates are based on  variations of 
the Edwards-Bell-Ohlson accounting model (Edwards and Bell 1961, Ohlson 1995). A growing 
literature compares and assesses the accuracy, validity and reliability of various ICC proxies 
developed, resulting in various alternative ICC specifications (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee 2005, 
Easton and Monahan 2005, Pastor et al. 2008, Botosan et al. 2011).  
As a result, many empirical studies use an average of various ICC models instead of using 
one (e.g., Francis et al. 2005, Hail and Leuz 2006, Daske et al. 2008, Muino and Trombetta 
2009, Li 2010, Kim et al. 2012, Blanco et al. 2015). We follow this approach and use four 
different ICC measures, namely the measures of Claus and Thomas (2001) (𝑟𝐶𝑇), Gebhardt et 
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al. (2001) (𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆), Gode and Mohanran (2003) (𝑟𝐺𝑀), and Easton (2004) (𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺). Appendix C 
describes the properties of the four models we use. 
 
3.3 Multivariate analyses 
We test our hypotheses using the following regression model: 
𝑟𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
(2) 
where 𝑟 is ICC based on the average of the four estimated ICC measures we compute and 
Disclos is DiscSaidin, DiscScaled or DiscRaw. Controls consist of factors that may be 
associated with ICC, including risk and country specific effects (see Botosan and Plumlee 2002, 
Hail 2002, Francis et al. 2005, Gietzmann and Ireland 2005, Francis et al. 2008, Daske et al. 
2008, Li 2010), namely the level of goodwill in each firm’s balance sheet i.e., percentage (%) 
of goodwill on book value of equity (GdwBV); the negative logarithmic transformation of the 
annual report page count (Readability) (Lawrence 2013); the absolute value of abnormal 
working capital accruals scaled by total assets (AWCA) (DeFond and Park 2001); the return on 
total assets (ROA); the market value to book value of equity (M2B); the total debt to book value 
of equity (Leverage); the natural logarithm of market value (Size); the return variance over the 
financial year (rVar); the EPS forecasts standard deviation (Dispersion); the market 
development, i.e., the market capitalisation of listed companies as a percentage of GDP for each 
country (MrktDev) (World Bank); and an index capturing the enforcement body’s strength in 
each country by considering eight characteristics including its powers, activities, and resources 
(Enforcement) (Brown et al. 2014). 
We perform OLS regression estimations using Eq. (2) where we include industry dummy 
variables based on ICB Level 2 industry classification.9 We also control for cross-sectional and 
                                                 
9 We do not include country dummy variables since these are correlated with the proxies for country characteristics 
in our models. This approach is in line with Preiato et al. (2015). 
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time series correlation by clustering by firm and year (Petersen 2009). A negative 𝑏1 in Eq. (2) 
will indicate support of our first hypothesis. In an attempt to address the inherent endogeneity 
issue when looking at disclosure and the cost of capital (see Nikolaev and van Lent 2005, Larker 
and Rusticus 2010), we also perform a panel data year fixed effects estimation as a robustness 
test.10 For brevity, we do not tabulate these but we discuss differences in the results when these 
exist. 
To test our second hypothesis, we first follow the Ramanna and Watts (2012) method to 
identify firms for which the market anticipates a goodwill impairment loss. We identify firms 
that have book to market (BTM) ratios lower than one at the end of year t – 2 and retain only 
those for which BTM is higher than one at the end of year t - 1. To minimise the likelihood that 
this BTM change is associated with other impairments, we also impose that BTM is higher than 
one at the end of year t. On that basis, if a firm is (not) expected to impair goodwill in a particular 
year and does (does not do) so, we categorise it as a firm that meets the market’s expectations 
(i.e., MrktMet = 1). If a firm is not (is) expected to impair goodwill in a particular year but it 
does (not do) so, we categorise it as a firm that does not meet the market’s expectations (i.e., 
MrktMet = 0). Having classified our sample firms in this way, we perform Eq. (2) in panel 
regression estimations across these two subsamples. We conjecture that disclosure levels for 
firms that do not meet the market expectations should matter more for investors. Therefore, 
higher disclosure within this sub-sample should reduce cost of equity capital more than that of 
                                                 
10 Year fixed effects estimation differs from OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen, 2009). 
This is because the Petersen (2009) firm and year clustering controls for firm autocorrelation (i.e., it holds firms 
stable, waiving the correlation among standard errors for the same company) and also controls for time-series 
dependence of standard errors (i.e., it holds time stable, imposing time independent effects on the explanatory 
variables). On the other hand, year fixed effects estimation controls only for time-series dependence of the 
explanatory variables. In other words, OLS with standard errors clustered by firm and year controls for both time 
and cross-section correlation, whereas year fixed effects controls only for time-series correlation. Using both 
enhances the robustness of our findings. 
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firms that do meet the market expectations. Our second hypothesis predicts a (more) negative 
𝑏1 in Eq. (2) for firms that do not meet the market’s expectations. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the extent to which sample firms comply with goodwill related mandatory 
disclosures during 2008-2011. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the full sample. Mean 
(median) degree of compliance with goodwill related mandatory disclosure is relatively high, 
with a minimum of 77.8% (78.6%) in 2008 and a maximum of 85.7% (88.9%) in 2010. 
Moreover, there are fully compliant firms in each year. To contextualise the importance of these 
findings, as shown in Table 4 below, the mean (median) ratio of goodwill to book value of 
equity for our sample firms is 70% (51%), indicating how material goodwill is for this set of 
firms. Nonetheless and consistent with prior studies (e.g., Al-Shammari et al. 2008, Al-Akra et 
al. 2010, Tsalavoutas 2011, Glaum et al. 2013), there exist important differences among firms’ 
mandatory disclosure levels. The standard deviation is around 14% while minimum compliance 
levels are 33%.  
Panel B presents the results of a Cuzick (1985) test, a non-parametric test for trends across 
ordered groups. There is a significant positive trend in compliance scores from 2008 to 2011 (p 
< 0.01) indicating that compliance scores improve over time. We also investigate this trend with 
a Mann-Whitney and a T-test for each pair of years tested and there is a statistically significant 
increase in compliance scores from 2008 to 2009 and from 2009 to 2010, while there is a slight 
decrease from 2010 to 2011 (p < 0.01). These results are also confirmed by Panel C: there are 
far more companies with 91% - 100% compliance in 2011 compared to 2008 (70 vs. 29 firms 
respectively). Moreover, a much smaller number of companies with 31% - 60% compliance 
exist in 2011 compared to 2008 (6 vs. 14 firms respectively).  
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Overall, Table 2 shows an improvement of mean compliance levels over time. 
Nevertheless, a relatively large number of firms still fail to comply in full with the standards’ 
requirements every year. This finding is consistent with the literature claiming that compliance 
with mandatory disclosure requirements is not ‘sticky over time’, because managers’ decision 
on whether to comply with the requirements is discretionary and depends on the regulatory risk 
they face. Mean (median) levels of compliance among different countries are shown in Panel 
D. Consistent with prior empirical evidence (Glaum et al. 2013), we document that compliance 
levels with mandatory disclosures differ significantly across countries.  
TABLE 2 – ABOUT HERE 
Table 3 provides information regarding specific items mandated by IFRS 3 and IAS 36, which 
are applicable to more than 100 firm-year observations and for which high non-compliance 
(i.e., less than 90% compliance) is observed. We highlight noticeable observations. 
To start with IFRS 3 (Panel A), although all our sample firms report a reconciliation of the 
carrying amount of goodwill at the beginning and the end of the period, a large portion of firms 
do not disclose the gross amount and accumulated goodwill impairment losses at the beginning 
of the period (only 79.8% of firms for which sub-paragraphs 75-a-i and B67-d-i are applicable, 
comply with these requirements) or the end of the period (only 86.9% of firms for which 75-a-
viii and B67-d-viii are applicable, comply). This type of difference across firms is particularly 
important for the purposes of our study. Prior literature indicates that goodwill impairment 
losses result in negative valuation effects (Hirschey and Richardson 2002).  
Moreover, we observe significant non-compliance with the item requiring information 
about the factors resulting in the recognition of goodwill for business combinations that were 
collectively material. Interestingly, the less prescriptive requirement in the revised paragraph 
B65-e seems to result in more firms complying (51.8% of firms for which sub-paragraph B65-
e is applicable) compared to the more stringent requirement in paragraph 68-h in the old IFRS 
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3 (9.1% of firms for which 68-h is applicable). Yet, financial statement users indicate that this 
is one of the most important pieces of information they are concerned with around business 
combinations (FRC 2014). Further, only 65.4% of firms that conducted business combinations 
that were collectively material, report the amounts recognised as of the acquisition date for each 
major class of assets acquired and liabilities assumed, although investors attach valuation 
weights to the identifiable components of purchased goodwill (Henning et al. 2000). Overall, 
our findings regarding IFRS 3 suggest that investors are confronted with differences across 
firms in the level of information they consider important.  
Turning to the disclosures mandated by IAS 36 (Panel B), most of the items with which 
companies do not comply relate to the estimations and assumptions used during the goodwill 
impairment testing process. For example, irrespective of whether companies use the value in 
use method or the fair value less cost to sell approach, a large proportion of them (29% and 
16% of firms for which 134-d-i and 134-e-i are applicable, respectively) do not disclose a 
description of each key assumption used by management to determine the recoverable amount. 
Similarly, a large proportion of firms (39% and 42% respectively) fail to disclose management’s 
approach to determine the value(s) assigned to each key assumption (sub-paragraphs 134-d-ii 
and 134-e-ii). Not disclosing this information appears to confirm the concerns expressed about 
the quality of goodwill impairment tests (Hoogendoorn 2006, Carlin and Finch 2009, 2010) and 
the absence of an ‘important input to users’ assessment of the amount, timing, and uncertainty 
of (the prospect for) future net cash inflows to the entity (ASBJ et al. 2014, p. 41). Moreover, 
in relation to sub-paragraph 129a, we identify a large proportion of companies (almost 30% of 
applicable firms) that recognise a material goodwill impairment loss but do not disclose the 
amount of this loss across each reportable segment. These findings confirm the views expressed 
by financial statement preparers that they are somewhat reluctant to disclose this type of 
information as they consider it proprietary (ASBJ et al. 2014). Hence, it appears that a large 
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number of firms do not provide important information to the market that is considered to be 
private (Bens et al. 2011, Li et al. 2011). Finally, compliance with the requirements of sub-
paragraph 134-f is also problematic. This item requires information related to a reasonably 
possible change in a key assumption that management has based its determination of the unit’s 
(group of units’) recoverable amount which would cause the carrying amount to exceed its 
recoverable amount. 
Overall, the compliance levels with the items in Table 3 are indicative of differences across 
firms in the level of firm-specific information that reaches financial statement users. This list 
reveals areas within individual IFRS that may need to be addressed by the standard setter in 
order to provide guidance on how these should be interpreted and applied. 
TABLE 3 – ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2 Univariate analysis 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the 
multivariate analyses.11 Panel A shows information about country- and firm-level independent 
variables, including the disclosure scores. Mean (median) disclosure is 0.614 (0.467), 0.275 
(0.257) and 0.564 (0.555) when the disclosure score is DiscScaled, DiscRaw or DiscSaidin 
respectively. There is considerable variation in these metrics; standard deviation is high (0.556, 
0.179 and 0.253, respectively). In fact, the variation is such that in some countries some firms 
disclose twice as much information than others (maximum DiscScaled is 2.00).  
As mentioned, goodwill is a large part of the equity book value for our firms with mean 
(median) GdwBV equal to 0.699 (0.507). Mean (median) market value of equity (MV) is 15.6 
(7.3) billion euros. These high values are expected given that our sample firms are drawn from 
                                                 
11 For Size and Readability we use transformations of market value (MV) and annual report page numbers 
(PageCount) in the univariate and multivariate analyses. For a better understanding of Size and Readability, 
though, we present their actual data of MV and PageCount without transformations in Table 4. 
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the S&P EU350 i.e., among the largest and most liquid stocks in Europe. Mean (median) market 
to book value (M2B) is 2.7 (1.9). The complexity of annual reports (as proxied by the number 
of pages) varies significantly across our sample firms: mean (median) number of pages is 200 
(179) with a maximum of 620 and a minimum of 54. On average, the sample firms are profitable 
(mean (median) ROA is 0.048 (0.044)), while debt-to-equity (Leverage) is 1.153 (0.71).  
In terms of country-level variables, the maximum value of MrktDev (i.e., market 
capitalisation to GDP) is 2.3, which relates to Switzerland. All other data are below 1, apart 
from that related to the UK and Sweden for 2009 and 2010. High variation in enforcement 
mechanisms among the countries investigated is also evident.  
Panel B gives descriptive statistics regarding our ICC measure (𝑟𝐴𝑉) for the full sample and 
for each year. Mean (median) 𝑟𝐴𝑉 varies from a minimum of 10.5% (10.4%) in 2010 to a 
maximum of 11.8% (10.9%) in 2011, showing also variation in the ICC during the period 
examined. Overall, mean (median) 𝑟𝐴𝑉 is 11.1% (10.6%), while the standard deviation is 4%. 
Panel C presents Cuzick test for trends, documenting no statistically significant trends in the 
ICC through the period examined. The Mann-Whitney test and the T-test report a statistically 
significant increase in ICC only from 2010 to 2011. Given that we employ an average measure, 
Panel D gives Pearson’s correlation coefficients across the different ICC models we use. All 
models are positively correlated and statistically significant (𝑝 < 0.01), suggesting that all four 
ICC measures capture similar information and our average ICC is robust. 
TABLE 4 – ABOUT HERE 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between all variables are presented in Table 5. As one would 
expect, our three disclosure proxies (DiscScaled, DiscRaw and DiscSaidin) correlate highly 
positively with each other (p < 0.01). Consistent with our hypotheses, this preliminary evidence 
shows that there is a negative and statistically significant correlation between the ICC and 
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compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements: DiscScaled, DiscRaw and DiscSaidin 
document a correlation coefficient of -0.141, -0.139 and -0.103 (p < 0.01), respectively. 
Country-adjusted compliance scores (DiscScaled and DiscRaw) are positively correlated 
with the percentage of goodwill to equity book value (GdwBV) with a correlation coefficient 
near to 0.150 (p < 0.01). DiscSaidin, which is not country-adjusted, is not significantly 
correlated with GdwBV. These imply that the higher the goodwill, the more the goodwill related 
mandatory information a firm tends to disclose at a country level, but not across the sample 
firms as a whole. This indicates that country characteristics are indeed important and could 
affect managerial discretion towards the decision making process (which is affected by 
regulatory risk) on whether a firm will comply with disclosure requirements. Consistent with 
this, the coefficients of both country specific variables, enforcement and market development 
(MrketDev), are positive (negative) and highly correlated (statistically significant at the 1% 
level (p < 0.01)) with all disclosure scores (ICC proxied by rAV). Hence, the stronger the 
enforcement in a country and the more developed the market is the higher the levels of goodwill 
related mandatory disclosure communicated to the market. Further, the stronger the 
enforcement and the more developed the market, the lower the ICC. Moreover, compliance 
levels are positively correlated with analyst forecast dispersion, indicating that higher 
compliance brings new information to the market, leading analysts to ‘disagree’ regarding 
future firm performance. Additionally, Size, profitability (ROA) and growth (M2B) are 
negatively correlated with ICC, while Leverage, return variance (rVar) and abnormal accruals 
(AWCA) have a positive relationship (all significant at 5% and 1% levels). Finally, the 
relationship between Size and Readability is negative, consistent with prior literature showing 
that larger firms have longer and more complex annual reports (Li 2010). 
TABLE 5 – ABOUT HERE 
 24 
 
Regarding our second hypothesis, we identify 570 (13) firm-year observations for which the 
market did not expect (expected) recognition of a goodwill impairment loss and these 
companies did not recognise (recognised) an impairment loss, as expected. We classify these 
583 firm-year observations as companies that meet the market expectations with regard to the 
recognition of goodwill impairment loss (MrktMet = 1). In contrast, we identify 235 (13) firm-
year observations for which the market did not expect (expected) recognition of a goodwill 
impairment loss but these companies did (did not) recognise, thus,  failing to meet expectations. 
We classify these 248 firm-year observations as companies that do not meet these market 
expectations (MrktMet = 0).  
Table 6 provides relevant descriptive statistics. Firms that meet the market expectations 
(MrktMet = 1) have higher country-adjusted disclosure scores (DiscScaled and DiscRaw) and 
lower ICC (rAV) than firms that do not. The mean and median differences are statistically 
significant at least at the 5% level. Firms meeting market expectation seem, on average, to 
provide much higher disclosure levels than their country minimums. Additionally, they 
experience a lower ICC compared to the firms not meeting market expectations. These firms 
also have statistically significant higher profitability (ROA) and market-to-book (M2B) ratios 
i.e., have higher growth opportunities. They also operate in countries with more developed 
stock markets and higher enforcement, compared to the firms that do not meet the market 
expectations. On the other hand, firms in this group have lower goodwill-to-book value of 
equity (GdwBV), statistically significantly fewer material impairment losses (MaterialIL), and 
less material business combinations (MaterialBC), compared to the firms that do not meet the 
market expectations (MrktMet = 0). These descriptive statistics indicate that the two sub-
samples are substantially different (e.g., growth, location, performance), allowing us to infer 
that they share different levels of information risk. Firms that do not meet the market 
expectations about recognition of a goodwill impairment loss are significantly riskier. 
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TABLE 6 – ABOUT HERE 
 
4.3 Multivariate analysis 
Table 7 presents our main findings. With regard to H1, results show that disclosure is negatively 
(coefficients for DiscSaidin, DiscScaled and DiscRaw are -0.011, -0.007 and -0.020 
respectively) and statistically significantly associated with ICC (p < 0.05).  
Regarding the remaining variables, Size and profitability (ROA) are negatively associated 
with ICC (significant at least at the 5% level). Companies experience lower ICC in more 
developed markets (MrktDev) and in countries with better enforcement mechanisms 
(Enforcement). Additionally, Readability is negatively associated with ICC (p < 0.10), 
suggesting that more concise annual reports result in a reduction in ICC, in line with Lawrence 
(2013). Under the year fixed effects estimation, MrktDev, Enforcement and Readability are not 
statistically significant. Instead, higher dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is associated with 
higher ICC (at the 10% level). This is in line with Francis et al. (2005) and Li (2010). Leverage 
is negatively associated with ICC (p < 0.05).  
TABLE 7 – ABOUT HERE 
These results support our first hypothesis that compliance with goodwill related mandatory 
disclosures have a negative association with ICC and contribute to the disclosure literature by 
providing some evidence about the economic consequences of disclosures mandated by 
accounting standards (Leuz and Wysocki 2016). IFRS 3 disclosures (e.g., provision of 
information on purchase price allocation, amount of goodwill (positive/negative) arising from 
business combinations, and a description of factors that make up the goodwill recognised) and 
IAS 36 disclosures (e.g., provision of information relating to the allocation of existing goodwill 
to CGUs and estimation of its recoverable amount, along with information including cash flow 
projection periods, growth rates, discount rates and events/circumstances that lead to 
impairment loss recognition) contribute to a reduction of estimation risk.  
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These disclosures enable financial statement users to gather information about a firm’s 
private information (Dye 1985), reducing uncertainty about forecasted earnings (Hope 2003) 
and estimation risk and improving information precision (Barry and Brown 1985, Hughes et al. 
2007, Lambert et al. 2007, 2012). When managers comply with the relevant mandated items 
(see Table 3), managerial private information becomes observable and verifiable by external 
stakeholders (Riedl 2004). Overall, our findings are in line the estimation risk/information 
precision theory. 
Our results also support our second hypothesis that compliance with goodwill related 
disclosures is indeed negatively associated with ICC. This link, however, is apparent only for 
firms not meeting the market expectations (MrktMet = 0). Results show that the coefficients for 
DiscSaidin, DiscScaled and DiscRaw are -0.016, -0.022 and -0.054, respectively. The 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level at least. With regard to the remaining 
factors, irrespective of the specification and sub-sample, profitability (ROA) is associated 
negatively with ICC. Overall, higher disclosures for firms that do not meet the market 
expectations matter for investors. A firm that recognises a goodwill impairment loss when not 
expected to do so (and vice versa) surprises investors, triggering them to revise their estimation 
risk of that firm. Thus, the level of goodwill related mandatory disclosure appears to have an 
important role in shedding light on why the firm goes against expectations and helps in revising 
future earnings and cash flows.  
Reflecting on our findings in Table 3, firms tend not to comply with items beneficial for 
investors in confirming their prior anticipation of a goodwill impairment loss. Thus, firms 
providing unexpected (or new) information to the market and at the same time providing more 
information compared to similar firms, benefit from a reduction in ICC. These results are also 
supportive of the above theory.  
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4.4 Additional tests – the interplay between enforcement and estimation risk 
The accounting literature widely documents that enforcement is a fundamental characteristic of 
the financial reporting environment in a country. Not only does it play a crucial role in the level 
of quality of financial statements themselves, but also on how market participants react to 
accounting information. With regard to the former, cross-country studies report a negative 
association between earnings management and enforcement strength (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003, 
Burgstahler et al. 2006, Callao and Jarne 2010). With regard to disclosures, Glaum and Street 
(2003) and Aerts and Tarca (2010) reach similar conclusions in that there is a positive 
association between disclosure behaviour and country enforcement. More relevant to our study, 
Glaum et al. (2013) report a positive association between country enforcement strength and 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements and Hope (2003) finds that firm’s annual 
report disclosure level is positively associated with forecast accuracy, with this being more 
prevalent in countries where enforcement is stronger. Daske et al. (2008) find capital-market 
benefits to be associated with mandatory adoption of IFRS only in countries where firms have 
incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong. Along similar lines, 
Armstrong et al. (2010) find an incrementally negative stock market reaction for firms 
domiciled in code law countries compared to common law countries and attribute this to 
investors' concerns over IFRS enforcement in these countries. Finally, Byard et al. (2011) find 
that the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption on forecast errors and forecast dispersion depend 
on the level of enforcement in the country of adoption. These studies conclude that even though 
IFRS are considered to be of higher quality than local accounting standards, financial reporting 
quality depends on enforcement.  
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We reflect on this issue by splitting our sample across countries with high vs low 
enforcement (based on the country median enforcement level).12 The results of these tests are 
provided in Tables 8 and 9.  
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
With regard to H1, we find that only for the sub-sample of companies in countries with high 
enforcement are the coefficients for DiscSaidin, DiscScaled and DiscRaw negative and 
significant (-0.013 at the 10% level, -0.010 at the 5% level and -0.029 at the 5% level, 
respectively). With regard to H2, higher compliance for firms that do not meet the market 
expectations matter for investors only if these firms operate in a country with strong 
enforcement.13 
These findings are not surprising. First, there are much higher compliance levels and a much 
higher deviation of these levels within the sub-sample of firms in countries with high 
enforcement. Untabulated descriptive statistics reveal that DiscSaidin, DiscScaled and DiscRaw 
scores are 0.62, 0.66, 0.29 respectively, compared to 0.48, 0.54, 0.25 for the corresponding sub-
sample of companies in countries with low enforcement. Further, these differences are 
significant at the 1% level. When analysts/investors follow firms in an environment with high 
enforcement they are able to evaluate the information around goodwill and its impairment 
testing process given that, by definition, a lot of the relevant information is present/disclosed. 
Thus, firms with relatively lower compliance levels in such an environment are penalised with 
higher ICC and vice versa. On the contrary, in an environment where enforcement is low, the 
lack of information in the notes of the financial statements is significant/material and 
analysts/investors are unable to evaluate the information around goodwill and its impairment 
                                                 
12 It is also noted that enforcement is positively associated with the non-country adjusted scores compliance scores 
(see Appendix B). 
13 All corresponding coefficients under fixed effects estimations are negative but not statistically significant. 
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testing process. Thus, variation in the (low) compliance levels is not associated with different 
levels of ICC. Second, these findings are partly in line with those in Abdullah et al. (2015) in 
that, in countries where enforcement is weak, compliance levels with mandatory disclosure 
requirements are not relevant to investors. Demand for public information is low and 
information is usually disseminated via private communication channels instead (Ball et al. 
2003).  
 
5. Sensitivity analyses 
Although our compliance scores take into account the number of applicable items that should 
be disclosed, if a company recognises an immaterial goodwill impairment loss, disclosure of 
information with regard to two additional items in our index is triggered. When a company 
recognises a material goodwill impairment loss, disclosure of information with regard to six or 
seven items in our index is triggered (depending on whether the recoverable amount is estimated 
with value in use, fair value, or both). Thus, goodwill related mandatory disclosures may be 
higher because of recognising an impairment loss. To ensure our results are driven by the level 
of compliance and not the loss itself, we perform the following tests: 1) we exclude the firms 
with material impairment losses of goodwill; 2) we incorporate a dummy variable capturing the 
occurrence of material goodwill impairments as another control in our tests; and 3) we add a 
dummy variable capturing the occurrence of an impairment loss (without separating into 
material and immaterial) as another control in our main tests. In all these cases, results are 
qualitatively similar.  
We also repeat our analysis for H1 after splitting the sample into high vs. low compliant 
countries, based on the sample median compliance score. Our results are similar to those we 
obtain for H1 when we split the sample across high vs. low enforcement. We are unable to run 
these tests for H2 due to the low number of observations across sub-samples. 
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Further, given the debate surrounding the validity of ICC measures, we rerun our regressions 
by using a single ICC measure i.e., the rMPEG (Easton 2004). Clarkson et al. (2013) suggest that 
rMPEG is best for ICC measures employing analyst forecasts. Although these tests reduce our 
sample from 831 to 785 firm-year observations, the results are almost identical to those in the 
main analysis. We additionally follow Muino and Trombetta (2009), Li (2010) and Kim et al. 
(2012) and use an average ICC for which we have estimates for all four measures. Again, the 
sample drops (from 831 to 635 firm-year observations) but results are qualitatively similar in 
that the two country-adjusted scores are significantly associated with ICC (but not DiscSaidin) 
when examining H1, and  the results for all compliance scores are statistically significant, albeit 
at the 10% level, when examining H2.  
Moreover, similar to Francis et al. (2008) and Muino and Trombetta (2009), we calculate 
ex-post cost of capital. We run firm-specific asset pricing models where the theoretical Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is augmented with a disclosure factor.14 The average firm beta is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level as expected. The average coefficient of the 
disclosure factor, however, is not statistically significant, consistent with Muino and Trombetta 
(2009), so H1 is not supported when we replicate our main analyses. Interestingly though, when 
testing H2, compliance continues to be negatively and statistically significantly associated with 
the cost of equity capital when the market’s expectations are not met. Thus, although we do not 
expect strong results because of the different nature of these models and their reduced power, 
we still find significant results for the sub-sample of firms not meeting the market’s 
                                                 
14 The use of realised returns for calculating the cost of equity capital, by definition, implies the use of ex-post 
information. Thus, it does not capture the same information as ICC. Using the CAPM may incorporate less noisy 
figures than other models, however CAPM assumes that cross-sectional variation in market beta drives variation 
in the cost of capital (Botosan 1997) and there is no theoretical room for disclosure or expectation that disclosure 
should affect the market beta. To construct our disclosure factor, we split the sample into two groups i.e., firms 
with high vs. low disclosure, based on the annual median compliance score. We calculate monthly returns for each 
firm, starting from June t + 1 to May t + 2. The high and low disclosure portfolios are reformed on an annual basis 
to create a low-minus-high (LMH) mimicking factor portfolio by subtracting the average monthly return of the 
low-disclosure portfolio minus that of the high-disclosure portfolio.  
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expectations. These results are robust when the disclosure factor is constructed with all the 
different disclosure scores and also when we use an augmented version of the Fama and French 
(1993) model, instead of the CAPM.  
Finally, we calculate an alternative disclosure metric, where we transform the actual 
disclosure scores in a percentile rank based on the actual scores of all sample firms on an annual 
basis, as in Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Nikolaev and van Lent (2005), and Glaum et al. 
(2013). Ranked variables are less sensitive to outliers (Cooke 1998) and have a normal 
distribution (McCabe 1989). We rerun our main analysis and results are again qualitatively 
similar, supporting both of our hypotheses. Hence, even when compliance scores are not 
country specific and there is no weighting of the items included in the disclosure lists, as in the 
case of the Saidin index, results still hold.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Looking at a set of non-financial firms members of  the S&P Europe 350 over a four-year period 
(2008-2011), we manually compute compliance with mandated goodwill disclosure from the 
notes of their financial statements. We first examine whether the level of compliance with the 
disclosure requirements is associated with firms’ ICC. We then take a step further and question 
the channel through which compliance is associated with ICC and investigate whether, and the 
extent to which, compliance levels have a differential association with ICC across sub-samples 
of companies that meet (or not) market expectations about the recognition of goodwill 
impairment losses. In our setting, differences across firm compliance with disclosure 
requirements reflect the trade-off between firm litigation costs resulting from non-disclosure 
(Skinner 1994) and proprietary costs resulting from disclosure of the information required by 
IAS 36 and IFRS 3. We argue that, in line with information precision/ estimation risk theory 
(Barry and Brown 1985, Hughes et al. 2007, Lambert et al. 2007, 2012), goodwill disclosures 
allow for a better understanding of future earnings and cash flows. They should lead to a 
 32 
 
reduction in estimation risk since they are specifically related to information about timing, 
amount and risk of future cash flows.  
Our results indicate significant differences in compliance levels with goodwill related 
disclosure requirements. We find a high variation in compliance levels with items that provide 
proprietary information and reveal management judgment and expectations (e.g., assumptions 
and estimations used in the application of value in use calculations; the amounts of impairment 
losses across reportable segments, and a qualitative description of the factors that make up the 
goodwill recognised in business combinations). Companies that exhibit higher compliance 
levels with these items benefit from a lower ICC (i.e., we find a negative association between 
compliance levels and ICC). Further, our results indicate that firms not meeting the market 
expectations with regard to goodwill impairment losses are significantly different from the 
remaining firms. They are, in fact, riskier compared to firms that meet the market’s 
expectations. Additionally, we find robust evidence that compliance levels with goodwill 
related disclosures requirements are negatively associated with ICC only when firms do not 
meet the market’s expectations. This supports our argument that increased levels of these 
disclosures mitigate estimation risk. The riskier firms do not meet the market’s expectations 
causing a surprise to the market, which seeks additional information through these disclosures. 
To the best of our knowledge, prior relevant analysis and evidence is absent in this regard. 
Finally, these results hold only in countries with high enforcement, highlighting the 
complementary role of enforcement for benefits arising from high quality reporting. 
Our findings, which add knowledge with regard to the economic consequences of 
disclosures mandated by accounting standards, should be appealing to regulators and financial 
statement preparers, and inform the current debate such as the IASB Disclosure Initiative and 
the FRC Disclosure Framework. We provide evidence that information disclosed in companies’ 
financial statements as a result of the requirements of relevant standards is associated with ICC. 
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This evidence could, arguably, assist in the development of more evidence-informed accounting 
standard-setting (Teixeira 2014). 
Our study is subject to caveats. Despite following all usual procedures to ensure the validity 
and reliability of our research instrument, the use of a disclosure index always entails a degree 
of subjectivity. This may hinder consistent replication of the research. Further, how one defines 
materiality can be an important limitation of studies like ours. To align our research with the 
perception of enforcers on this issue, however, we follow the materiality threshold identified 
by ESMA in its 2013 review of impairment of goodwill and other intangible assets in the IFRS 
financial statements of 235 companies for 2011. Nevertheless, as we show in Table 3, many of 
the items for which we identify non-compliance are somewhat less subject to a materiality 
threshold. Additionally, the compliance levels we identify are in line with prior literature 
focusing in particular on this type of disclosures. Hence, even if one argues that our thresholds 
are not perfect, we believe that they capture sufficiently the variation in goodwill related 
mandatory disclosures that companies provide and users of financial statements consider 
important for their needs. Moreover, our sample excludes financial constituents of the S&P EU 
350. Given their size and importance in the European economies, their level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures and corresponding potential consequences remain unexplored. We also 
acknowledge that caution is needed when interpreting our results due to potential endogeneity 
and/or econometric problems associated with the use of a non-country adjusted compliance 
score.  
Future research could complement our study. Our sample firms are the most liquid and 
important non-financial European firms. Using a sample consisting of only financial and/or 
smaller non-financial firms may document different results. Finally, our study considers only 
one type of disclosure (i.e., goodwill related mandatory disclosure). Future studies could 
consider other aspects of disclosures mandated by accounting standards. 
  34 
References 
Abdullah, M., Evans, L., Fraser, I. and Tsalavoutas, I., 2015. IFRS Mandatory disclosures in 
Malaysia: the influence of family control and the value (ir)relevance of compliance 
levels. Accounting Forum, 39 (4), 328-348. 
Accounting Standard Board of Japan (ASBJ), European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
(EFRAG) and Organismo Italiano di Contabilità (OIC), 2015. Should goodwill still not 
be amortised? Available from: http://www.efrag.org/files/Goodwill%20Impairment 
%20and%20Amortisation/140725_Should_goodwill_still_not_be_amortised_Research
_Group_paper.pdf [Accessed 8 June 2015] 
Adams, G., 1994. What is compliance? Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 2 
(4), 278-285. 
Al Jifri, K. and Citron, D., 2009. The value-relevance of financial statement recognition 
versus note disclosure: Evidence from goodwill accounting. European Accounting 
Review, 18 (1), 123-140. 
Al-Akra, M., Eddie, I. and Jahangir, A.M., 2010. The association between privatization and 
voluntary disclosure: Evidence from Jordan. Accounting and Business Research, 40 (1), 
55-74. 
Ali, J.M., Ahmed, K. and Henry, D., 2004. Disclosure compliance with national accounting 
standards by listed companies in South Asia. Accounting and Business Research, 34 (3), 
183-199.  
Al-Shammari, B., Brown, P. and Tarca, A., 2008. An investigation of compliance with 
international accounting standards by listed companies in the Gulf Co-Operation Council 
member states. International Journal of Accounting, 43 (4), 425-447. 
Anctil, R.M., Dickhaut, J., Kanodia, C. and Shapiro, B., 2004. Information transparency and 
coordination failure: theory and experiment. Journal of Accounting Research, 42 (2), 
159-195. 
André, P., Filip, A. and Paugam, L., 2015. The effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on 
conditional conservatism in Europe. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 42, 482-
514. 
Armstrong C.S., Barth M.E., Jagolinzer A.D. and Riedl E.J., 2010. Market Reaction to the 
Adoption of IFRS in Europe. The Accounting Review, 85 (1), 31-61.  
Artiach, T.C. and Clarckson, P.M., 2011. Disclosure, conservatism and the cost of equity 
capital: A review of the foundation literature. Accounting and Finance, 51(1), 2-49. 
Ayers, B.J., Schwab, C.M. and Utke, S., 2015. Noncompliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements: The magnitude and determinants of undisclosed permanently reinvested 
earnings. Accounting Review, 90 (1), 59-93. 
Baiman, S. and Verrecchia, R.E., 1996. The relation among capital markets, financial 
disclosure, production efficiency, and insider trading. Journal of Accounting Research, 
34 (1), 1-22. 
Ball, R., Robin, A. and Wu, J.S., 2003. Incentives versus standards: Properties of accounting 
income in four East Asian countries. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(2), 235-
270. 
Barry, C. and Brown, S., 1985. Differential information and security market equilibrium. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20 (4), 407-422. 
Barth, M. and Clinch, G., 1996 International accounting differences and their relation to share 
prices: Evidence from U.K., Australian, and Canadian firms. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 13 (2), 135-170. 
Barth, M. and Israeli, D., 2013. Disentangling mandatory IFRS reporting and changes in 
enforcement. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 56(2-3), 178-188. 
  35 
Barth, M., Konchitchki, Y. and Landsman, W., 2013. Cost of capital and earnings 
transparency. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 55 (2-3), 206-224. 
Bens, D., Heltzer, W. and Segal, B., 2011. The information content of goodwill impairments 
and SFAS 142. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 26 (3), 527-555. 
Bertomeu, J. and Cheynel, E., 2016. Disclosure and the cost of capital: A survey of the 
theoretical literature. Abacus, 52(2), 221-258. 
Beyer, A., Cohen, D.A., Lys, T.Z. and Walther, B.R., 2010. The financial reporting 
environment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50 
(2-3), 296-343. 
Blanco, B., Garcia Lara, J.M. and Tribo, J.A., 2015. Segment disclosure and cost of capital. 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 42(3&4), 367-411. 
Botosan, C. and Plumlee, M., 2002. A re-examination of disclosure levels and expected cost 
of equity capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 40 (1), 21-40. 
Botosan, C. and Plumlee, M., 2005. Assessing alternative proxies for the expected risk 
premium. Accounting Review, 80 (1), 21-53. 
Botosan, C., 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. Accounting Review, 72 (3), 
323-349. 
Botosan, C., 2006. Disclosure and the cost of equity capital: What do we know? Accounting 
and Business Research, International Accounting Policy Forum, 31-40. 
Botosan, C., Plumlee, M. and Wen, H., 2011. The relation between expected returns, realized 
returns, and firm risk characteristics. Contemporary Accounting Research, 28 (4), 1085-
1122. 
Brown, P., Preiato, J. and Tarca, A., 2014. Measuring country differences in enforcement of 
accounting standards: an audit and enforcement proxy. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 41(1-2), 1-52. 
Buijink, W., 2006. Evidence-based financial reporting regulation. ABACUS, 42(3-4), 296-
301. 
Burgstahler, D. C., Hail, L. and Leuz, C., 2006. The importance of reporting incentives: 
Earnings management in European private and public firms. The Accounting Review, 
81(5), 983-1016. 
Bushee, B. and Leuz, C., 2005. Economic consequences of SEC disclosure regulation: 
Evidence from the OTCBB. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39 (2), 233-264. 
Byard, D., Li, Y. and Yu, Y., 2011. The effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on financial 
analysts’ information environment. Journal of Accounting Research, 49(1), 69-96. 
Callao, S. and Jarne, J.I., 2010. Have IFRS affected earnings management in the European 
Union. Accounting in Europe, 7(2), 159-189.  
Camfferman, K. and Cooke, T., 2002. An Analysis of Disclosure in the Annual Reports of 
UK and Dutch Companies. Journal of International Accounting Research, 1(1), 3-30 
Carlin, T.M. and Finch, N., 2009. Discount rates in disarray: Evidence on flawed goodwill 
impairment testing. Australian Accounting Review, 19 (4), 326-336. 
Carlin, T.M. and Finch, N., 2010. Resisting compliance with IFRS goodwill accounting and 
reporting disclosures – Evidence from Australia. Journal of Accounting & 
Organizational Change, 6 (2), 260-280. 
Chalmers, K., Clinch, G., Godfrey, J.M. and Wei, Z., 2012. Intangible Assets, IFRS and 
Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts. Accounting & Finance, 52(3), 691–721. 
Chauvin, K.W. and Hirschey, M., 1994. Goodwill, profitability, and the market value of the 
firm. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 13 (2), 159-180. 
Clarkson, P., Fang, X., Li, Y., Richardson, G., 2013. The relevance of environmental 
disclosures: Are such disclosures incrementally informative? Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, 32 (5), 410-431. 
  36 
Clarkson, P., Guedes, J. and Thompson, R., 1996. On the diversification, observability and 
measurement of estimation risk. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31 (1), 
69-84. 
Claus, J. and Thomas, J., 2001. Equity premia as low as three percent? Evidence from 
analysts’ earnings forecasts for domestic and international stock markets. Journal of 
Finance, 56 (5), 1629-1666. 
Coles, J., Loewenstein, U. and Suay, J., 1995. On equilibrium pricing under parameter 
uncertainty. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 30 (3), 347-374. 
Cooke, T., 1992. The impact of size, stock market listing and industry type on disclosure in 
the annual reports of Japanese listed corporations. Accounting and Business Research, 87 
(22), 229-237 
Cooke, T., 1998. Regression analysis in accounting disclosure studies. Accounting and 
Business Research, 28 (3), 209-224. 
Cuzick, J., 1985. A Wilcoxon-type test for trend. Statistics in Medicine, 87 (4), 87-89. 
Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C. and Verdi, R., 2008. Mandatory IFRS reporting around the 
world: Early evidence on the economic consequences. Journal of Accounting Research, 
46 (5), 1085-1142. 
De Fond, M. and Park, C., 2001. The reversal effect of abnormal accruals and the market 
valuation of earnings surprises. Accounting Review, 76 (3), 375-404. 
Dhaliwal, D.S., Krull, L. and Li, O., 2007. Did the 2003 Tax Act reduce the cost of equity 
capital? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43 (1), 121-150. 
Dhaliwal, D.S., Li, O.Z., Tsang, A. and Yang, Y.G., 2011. Voluntary Non-Financial 
Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital: The Initiation of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Reporting, The Accounting Review, 86(1), 59–100. 
Diamond, D. and Verrecchia, R.E., 1991. Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. Journal 
of Finance, 46 (4), 1325-1359. 
Dugar, A. and Nathan, S., 1995. The effect of investment banking relationships on financial 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and investment recommendations. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 12 (1), 131-160. 
Dye, R.A. and Sridhar, S.S., 2008. A positive theory of flexibility in accounting standards. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46 (2-3), 312-333. 
Dye, R.A., 1985. Strategic accounting choice and the effect of alternative financial reporting 
requirements. Journal of Accounting Research, 23 (2), 544-574. 
Dye, R.A., 1986. Proprietary and non-proprietary disclosures. Journal of Business, 59(2), 
331–336. 
Easley, D. and O’Hara, M., 2004. Information and the cost of capital. Journal of Finance, 59 
(4), 1553-1583. 
Easton, P. and Monahan, S., 2005. An evaluation of the reliability of accounting based 
measures of expected returns: A measurement error perspective. Accounting Review, 80 
(2), 501-538. 
Easton, P. and Sommers, G., 2007. Effect of analysts’ optimism on estimates of the expected 
rate of return implied by earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research, 45 (5), 983-
1015. 
Easton, P., 2004. PE ratios, PEG ratios, and estimating the implied expected rate of return on 
equity capital. Accounting Review, 79 (1), 73-96. 
Easton, P.D and Monahan, S.J, 2015. Review of Recent Research on Improving Earnings 
Forecasts and Evaluating Accounting-based Estimates of the Expected Rate of Return on 
Equity Capital, ABACUS, 52(1), 35-58. 
Edwards, E. and Bell, P., 1961. The theory and measurement of business income. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
  37 
Elton, J., 1999. Expected return, realized return, and asset pricing tests. Journal of Finance, 
54 (4), 1199-1220. 
Ernst & Young (EY), 2010. Meeting today’s financial challenges – impairment reporting: 
Improving stakeholder confidence. Ernst & Young publication, 24 p. 
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), 2012. Towards a Disclosure 
Framework for the Notes – Discussion paper. Available from 
http://www.efrag.org/files/ProjectDocuments/PAAinE%20Disclosure%20Framework/1
21015_Disclosure_Framework_-_FINAL1.pdf [Accessed 8 June 2015]. 
European Security and Markets Authority (ESMA), 2013. European enforcers review of 
impairment of goodwill and other intangible assets in the IFRS financial statements. 
Available from http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2013-02.pdf [Accessed 8 June 
2015]. 
Fama, E. and French, K R., 2002. The equity premium. Journal of Finance, 57 (2), 637-659. 
Fama, E. and French, K., 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 33 (1), 3-56. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 2015. Accounting for goodwill for public 
business entities and not-for-profit entities. Available from 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=FASBContent_C&pagename=FASB%2FFAS
BContent_C%2FProjectUpdatePage&cid=1176163679475 [Accessed 8 June 2015] 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), 2012. Thinking about disclosures in a broader context. 
A road map for a disclosure framework. 
http://www.efrag.org/files/ProjectDocuments/PAAinE%20Disclosure%20Framework/1
21015_Disclosure_Framework_-_FINAL1.pdf [Accessed 8 June 2015]. 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), 2014. Investor views on intangible assets and their 
amortization. Available from https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Publications/Accounting-and-Reporting-Policy/Research-Report-Investor-Views-
on-Intangible-Asset.pdf [Accessed 8 June 2015] 
Francis, J., Khurana, I.K. and Pereira, R., 2005. Disclosure incentives and effects on cost of 
capital around the world. Accounting Review, 80 (4), 1125-1162. 
Francis, J., Nanda, D. and Olsson, P., 2008. Voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost 
of capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 46 (1), 53-99. 
Frankel, R.M. and Lee, C.M.C., 1999. Accounting diversity and international valuation. 
Available from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658 [Accessed 8 
June 2015]. 
Gebhardt, W., Lee, C. and Swaminathan, B., 2001. Towards an ex-ante cost of capital. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 39 (1), 135-176. 
Gietzmann, M.B. and Ireland, J., 2005. Cost of Capital, Strategic Disclosures and Accounting 
Choice. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32 (9-10), 599-634. 
Gietzmann, M.B. and Trombetta, M., 2003. Disclosure interactions: accounting policy choice 
and voluntary disclosure effects on the cost of raising outside capital. Accounting and 
Business Research, 33 (3), 187-205. 
Glaum, M. and Street, D.L., 2003. Compliance with the disclosure requirements of Germany’s 
new market: IAS versus US GAAP. Journal of international financial management and 
accounting, 14 (1), 64-100. 
Glaum, M., Schmidt, P., Street, D.L. and Vogel, S., 2013. Compliance with IFRS3- and 
IAS36-required disclosures across 17 European countries: company- and country-level 
determinants. Accounting and Business Research, 43 (3), 163-204. 
Gode, D. and Mohanram, P., 2003. Inferring the cost of capital using the Ohlson-Juettner 
model. Review of Accounting Studies, 8 (3), 399-431. 
  38 
Gordon, J. and Gordon, M., 1997. The finite horizon expected return model. Financial 
Analysts Journal, 53 (3), 52-61. 
Gray, S.J., Radebaugh, L.H. and Robert, C.B., 1990. International perceptions of cost 
constraints on voluntary information disclosures: a comparative study of UK & US 
multinationals. Journal of International Business Studies, 21 (4), 597-622. 
Hail, L. and Leuz, C., 2006. International differences in the cost of equity capital: Do legal 
institutions and securities regulation matter? Journal of Accounting Research, 44 (3), 
485-531. 
Hail, L., 2002. The Impact of Voluntary Corporate Disclosures on the Ex Ante Cost of Capital 
for Swiss Firms. European Accounting Review, 11 (4), 741-743. 
Harris, T. S., and S. Morsfield. 2012. An Evaluation of the Current State and Future of XBRL 
and Interactive Data for Investors and Analysts. Available from 
http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/filemgr?&file_id=7313156 [Accessed 8 June 2015] 
Healy, P.M., Palepu, K.G. and Sweeney, A.H., 1999. Stock performance and intermediation 
changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 16 (3), 485-520. 
Henning, S.L., Barry, L.L. and Shaw, W.H., 2000. Valuation of the components of purchased 
goodwill. Journal of Accounting Research, 38 (2), 375-386. 
Hirschey, M. and Richardson, V.J., 2002. Information content of accounting goodwill 
numbers. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 21 (3), 173-191. 
Hodgdon, C., Tondkar, R., Adhikari, A. and Harless, D., 2009. Compliance with International 
Financial Reporting Standards and auditor choice: New evidence on the importance of 
the statutory audit. The International Journal of Accounting, 44 (1), 33–55.  
Hodgdon, C., Tondkar, R., Harless, D. and Adhikari, W.A., 2008. Compliance with IFRS 
disclosure requirements and individual analysts' forecast errors. Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 17 (1), 1-13. 
Hoogendoorn, M., 2006. International accounting regulation and IFRS implementation in 
Europe and beyond – Experiences with first-time adoption in Europe. Accounting in 
Europe, 3 (1), 23-26. 
Hoogervorst, H. (2013). ‘Breaking the boilerplate’. Available from 
http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/Conference/Documents/2013/HH-Amsterdam-June-
2013.pdf, [Accessed 8 June 2015]. 
Hoogervorst, H., 2012. Speech on “The imprecise world of accounting” at the International 
Association for Accounting Education & Research (IAAER) conference in Amsterdam. 
Available from http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/Conference/Pages/HH-speech-Amsterdam-
June-2012.aspx [Accessed 8 June 2015).   
Hope, O.K., 2003. Accounting policy disclosure and analysts’ forecasts. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 20 (2), 295-321. 
Hou, K., van Dijk, M.A. and Zhang, Y., 2012. The implied cost of capital: A new approach. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 53 (3), 504-526. 
Hughes, J.S., Liu, J. and Liu, J., 2007. Information asymmetry, diversification, and cost of 
capital. Accounting Review, 82 (3), 705-729. 
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), 2013. Discussion Forum - Financial 
Reporting Disclosure. Feedback Statement. Available from 
http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/PressRelease/Documents/2013/Feedback-Statement-
Discussion-Forum-Financial-Reporting-Disclosure-May-2013.pdf [Accessed 8 June 
2015]. 
International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), 2015. Report and Feedback Statement – 
Post-Implementation Review of IFRS3 Business Combinations. Available from 
  39 
http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/PIR/PIR-IFRS-3/Documents/PIR_ 
IFRS%203-Business-Combinations_FBS_WEBSITE.pdf [Accessed 8 June 2015]. 
Jenkinson, D., 1996. Compliance culture. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 
4 (1), 41-46. 
Jennings, R., Robinson, J., Thompson, R.B. and Duvall, L., 1996. The relation between 
accounting goodwill numbers and equity values. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, 23 (4), 513-533. 
Kim, O. and Verrecchia, R.E., 1994. Market liquidity and volume around earnings 
announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17 (1-2), 41-68. 
Kim, Y., Li, H. and Li, S, 2012. Does eliminating the Form 20-F reconciliation from IFRS to 
U.S. GAAP have capital market consequences? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
53 (1-2), 249-270. 
Knauer, T., and Wohrmann, A., 2015. Market reaction to goodwill impairments. European 
Accounting Review, 25 (3), 421-449. 
KPMG, 2014. Who cares about goodwill impairment? A collection of stakeholder views. 
Available from http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/ 
Documents/Who-cares-about-goodwill-impairment-O-201404.pdf [Accessed 8 June 
2015] 
Lambert, R.A., Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R.E., 2007. Accounting information, disclosure, and 
the cost of capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 45 (2), 385-420. 
Lang, M. and Lundholm, R., 1993. Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of 
corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 31 (2), 246-271. 
Larker, D.F. and Rusticus, T.O., 2010. On the use of instrumental variables in accounting 
research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49 (2), 186-205. 
Lawrence, A., 2013. Individual investors and financial disclosure. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 56 (1), 130-147 
Lee, C., 2011. The Effect of SFAS 142 on the Ability of Goodwill to Predict Future Cash 
Flows. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 30(3), 236–255. 
Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R.E., 2000. The economic consequences of increased disclosure. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 38 (supplement), 91-124. 
Leuz, C. and Wysocki, P., 2016. The economics of disclosure and financial reporting 
regulation: Evidence and suggestions for future research.  Journal of Accounting 
Research, 54 (2), 525-622. 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D.J. and Wysocki, P.D., 2003. Earnings management and investor 
protection: An international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69 (3), 505-
527. 
Li, S., 2010. Does mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards in the 
European Union reduce the cost of equity capital? Accounting Review, 85 (2), 607-636. 
Li, Z., Schroff, P.K., Venkataraman, R. and Zhang, I.V., 2011. Causes and consequences of 
goodwill impairment losses. Review of Accounting Studies, 16 (4), 745-778. 
Lys, T.Z., Vincent, L. and Yehuda, N., 2012. The Nature and Implications of Acquisition 
Goodwill. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1802612 orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1802612 
Mahoney, P.G., 1995. Mandatory disclosure as a solution to agency problems. University of 
Chicago Law Review, 62 (3), 1047-1112. 
Mazzi, F., Liberatore, G. and Tsalavoutas, I., (2016). Insights on CFOs perceptions about IAS 
36 reporting. Accounting in Europe, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449480.2016.1244341. 
McCabe, B.P.M., 1989. Misspecification tests in econometrics based on ranks. Journal of 
Econometrics, 40 (2), 261-278. 
McCarthy, M. and Schneider, D., 1995. Market perception of goodwill: some empirical 
evidence. Accounting and Business Research, 26 (1), 69-81. 
  40 
Muino, F. and Trombetta, M., 2009. Does graph disclosure bias reduce the cost of equity 
capital? Accounting and Business Research, 39 (2), 83-102. 
Nikolaev, V. and Van Lent, L., 2005. The endogeneity bias in the relation between cost-of-
debt capital and corporate disclosure policy. European Accounting Review, 14 (4), 677-
724. 
Ohlson, J. and Juettner-Nauroth, B., 2005. Expected EPS and EPS growth as determinants of 
value. Review of Accounting Studies, 10 (2-3), 349-365. 
Ohlson, J., 1995. Earnings, book value, and dividends in security valuation. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 11 (2), 661-687. 
Owusu-Ansah, S., 1998. The Impact of Corporate Attributes on the Extent of Mandatory 
Disclosure and Reporting by Listed Companies in Zimbabwe. The International Journal 
of Accounting, 33 (5), 605–631. 
Pastor, L., Sinha, M. and Swaminathan, B., 2008. Estimating the Intertemporal Risk–Return 
Tradeoff using the Implied Cost of Capital, The Journal of Finance, 63(6), 2859–97. 
Paugam, L., Astolfi, P. and Ramond, O., 2015. Accounting for business combinations: Do 
purchase price allocations matter? Journal of Accounting and Public Policy. 34 (4), 362-
391. 
Petersen, M.A., 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing 
approaches, The Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480. 
Pownall, G. and Schipper, K., 1999. Implications of accounting research for the SEC’s 
consideration of International Accounting Standards for U.S. securities offerings. 
Accounting Horizons, 13 (3), 259-280. 
Preiato, J., Brown, P. and Tarca, A., 2015. A comparison of between-country measures of 
legal setting and enforcement of accounting standards. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 42 (1-2), 1-50. 
Ramanna, K. and Watts, R.L., 2012. Evidence on the use of unverifiable estimates in required 
goodwill impairment. Review of Accounting Studies, 17(4), 749-780. 
Richardson, A.J. and Welker, M., 2001. Social disclosure, financial disclosure and the cost of 
equity capital. Accounting, Organisations and Society, 26 (7-8), 597-616. 
Riedl, E.J., 2004. An examination of long-lived asset impairment. Accounting Review, 79 (3), 
823-852. 
Robinson, J.R., Xue, Y. and Yu, Y., 2011. Determimants of disclosure noncompliance and 
the effect of the SEC review: Evidence from the 2006 mandated compensation disclosure 
regulations. Accounting Review, 86 (4), 1415-1444. 
Skinner, D.J., 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 32 (1), 38-60. 
Teixeira, A., 2014. The International Accounting Standards Board and Evidence-Informed 
Standard-Setting. Accounting in Europe, 11 (1), 5-12. 
Timmermann, A. 1993. How learning in financial markets generates excess volatility and 
predictability in stock prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (4), 1135-1145. 
Tsalavoutas, I., 2011. Transition to IFRS and compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements: What is the signal? Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in 
International Accounting, 27 (2), 390-405. 
Tsalavoutas, I., Evans, L. and Smith, M., 2010. Comparison of two methods for measuring 
compliance with IFRS mandatory disclosure requirements. Journal of Applied 
Accounting Research, 11 (3), 213-228. 
Verrecchia, R.E., 2001. Essays on disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32 (1-
3), 97-180. 
  41 
Wallace, R.S.O. and Naser, K., 1995. Firm-Specific Determinants of the Comprehensiveness 
of Mandatory Disclosures in the Corporate Annual Reports of Firms Listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 14 (4), 311-368. 
Welker, M., 1995. Disclosure policy, information asymmetry, and liquidity in equity markets. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 11 (2), 801-827. 
  42 
Appendix A – IFRSs disaggregation and disclosure items identification 
STANDARD AND 
PARAGRAPH 
TEXT 
SCORE 
(N.A. – 0 – 1) 
IAS36-p134 
An entity shall disclose the information required by (a)–(f) for 
each cash-generating unit (group of units) for which the 
carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with 
indefinite useful lives allocated to that unit (group of units) is 
significant in comparison with the entity’s total carrying 
amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful 
lives: 
APP. – N.A. 
IAS36-p134-d 
if the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount is based on 
value in use: 
APP. – N.A. 
IAS36-p134-d-i 
a description of each key assumption on which management 
has based its cash flow projections for the period covered by 
the most recent budgets/forecasts. Key assumptions are those 
to which the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount is 
most sensitive. 
0 – 1 
IAS36-p134-d-ii 
a description of management’s approach to determining the 
value(s) assigned to each key assumption, whether those 
value(s) reflect past experience or, if appropriate, are 
consistent with external sources of information, and, if not, 
how and why they differ from past experience or external 
sources of information. 
0 – 1 
IAS36-p134-d-iii 
the period over which management has projected cash flows 
based on financial budgets/forecasts approved by 
management and, when a period greater than five years is 
used for a cash-generating unit (group of units), an 
explanation of why that longer period is justified. 
0 – 1 
IAS36-p134-d-iv 
the growth rate used to extrapolate cash flow projections 
beyond 
the period covered by the most recent budgets/forecasts, and 
the justification for using any growth rate that exceeds the 
long-term 
average growth rate for the products, industries, or country or 
countries in which the entity operates, or for the market to 
which the unit (group of units) is dedicated. 
 
0 – 1 
IAS36-p134-d-v the discount rate(s) applied to the cash flow projections. 0 – 1 
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Appendix B – Additional tests for the validity of the disclosure scores 
We validate our measure of goodwill related mandatory disclosure by testing its association with variables 
identified in prior relevant literature (i.e., Wallace et al. 1994, Ali et al. 2004, Glaum et al. 2013, Tsalavoutas et 
al. 2014) as significant determinants of mandatory disclosure levels. We do so in five multivariate regression 
models where the three disclosure measures we employ in the main analysis (namely DiscSaidin, DiscScaled 
and DiscRaw) as well as the actual score (Disc) and the transformed score we use in the sensitivity analysis 
(DRank in line with Botosan 1997) are the dependent variables. The independent variables used are as follows. 
GdwBV (the % of goodwill to book value of equity), MaterialIL (a dummy variable that equals one if the firm 
has experienced a material impairment loss on goodwill (more than 5% of goodwill at beginning of year t as 
reported in the financial statements) and 0 otherwise), MaterialBC (a dummy variable that takes one in case a 
firm experienced a material business combination (more than 5% of total assets or sales) and 0 otherwise, as at 
beginning of the year as reported in the financial statements), MrktMet (a dummy variable that equals one if a 
firm met the market expectation in terms of goodwill impairment loss and zero otherwise). Size (natural 
logarithm of market value), Leverage (total debt to book value of equity), Liquidity (current assets to current 
liabilities), ROA (return on assets), Strategic Ownership (aggregate % of ownership held by institutional 
investors and pension funds who hold more than 5% of companies’ shares), Enforcement (the Brown et al. (2014) 
index relating to the enforcement body i.e., its powers, activities and resources across countries) and dummy 
variables capturing industry participation. 
Table B1 documents descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables not used in the paper’s 
main analysis but used only for validating our disclosure scores. Table B2 presents the findings of this validation 
process. Results show that our disclosure measures are consistently positively and statistically significantly 
associated with size (Size) and with % of goodwill to book value of equity (GdwBV). Recognising a material 
impairment loss (MaterialIL) and meeting the market expectation in terms of goodwill impairment loss 
(MrktMet) also increase disclosure. Additionally, all five disclosure scores are consistently negatively associated 
with the occurrence and reporting of a material business combination (MaterialBC). Moreover, we find that the 
three non-country adjusted scores (Disc, DRank and DiscSaidin) are positively associated with Enforcement 
while the two country adjusted scores (DiscScaled and DiscRaw) are positively associated with Strategic 
Ownership instead. These results confirm validity of our disclosure measures as they are consistent with our 
expectations and prior literature. Moreover, the fact that the two country adjusted scores are not statistically 
significantly associated with enforcement allows us to also conclude that these two disclosure scores are not 
alternative proxies for enforcement. 
 
Table B1 – Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables not reported in the paper but 
in the index validation models 
Variable n Mean St. dev Min Median Max 
Disc 831 0.823 0.137 0.333 0.833 1.000 
DRank 831 0.610 0.291 0.000 0.597 1.000 
MaterialIL 831 0.087 0.281 0 0 1 
MaterialBC 831 0.723 0.448 0 1 1 
MrktMet 831 0.702 0.458 0 1 1 
Strategic Ownership 831 0.062 0.082 0.000 0.050 0.460 
Liquidity 831 1.265 0.547 0.279 1.134 3.877 
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Table B2 – Multivariate Tests for Index validation 
VARIABLES Disc DRank DiscSaidin DiscScaled DiscRaw 
Constant 
0.719*** 
(14.93) 
0.381*** 
(3.70) 
0.488*** 
(6.64) 
0.129 
(0.90) 
0.130** 
(2.46) 
GdwBV a 
0.035*** 
(2.98) 
0.084*** 
(3.27) 
0.039** 
(1.99) 
0.120*** 
(2.78) 
0.058*** 
(3.91) 
MaterialIL 
0.097*** 
(6.53) 
0.229*** 
(6.89) 
0.168*** 
(6.86) 
0.263*** 
(5.15) 
0.109*** 
(6.40) 
MaterialBC 
-0.057*** 
(-4.58) 
-0.127*** 
(-4.90) 
-0.254*** 
(-12.40) 
-0.067* 
(-1.69) 
-0.048*** 
(-3.54) 
MrktMet 
0.045*** 
(3.85) 
0.101*** 
(3.82) 
0.029 
(1.40) 
0.117*** 
(3.50) 
0.048*** 
(3.82) 
Size 
0.007** 
(2.08) 
0.016** 
(2.13) 
0.007* 
(1.93) 
0.014*** 
(2.83) 
0.013*** 
(2.72) 
Leverage a 
-0.004 
(-0.55) 
-0.005 
(-0.32) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
-0.026 
(-1.28) 
-0.011 
(-1.41) 
ROA a 
0.127 
(0.85) 
0.239 
(0.78) 
0.320 
(1.42) 
0.081 
(0.17) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
Strategic Ownership a 
-0.008 
(-0.11) 
-0.039 
(-0.23) 
-0.031 
(-0.25) 
0.792*** 
(3.60) 
0.208** 
(2.54) 
Liquidity 
0.008 
(0.49) 
0.017 
(0.52) 
0.015 
(0.59) 
-0.047 
(-0.91) 
-0.007 
(-0.41) 
Enforcement 
0.003** 
(2.15) 
0.009** 
(2.52) 
0.008*** 
(3.26) 
0.023 
(1.03) 
0.006 
(1.26) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
N 831 831 831 831 831 
F 8.65*** 9.48*** 18.41*** 18.89*** 16.65*** 
R2-adj 0.136 0.167 0.270 0.330 0.277 
Mean VIF 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65 
a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
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Appendix C – Description of Implied cost of equity (ICC) models used 
 
1. Claus and Thomas (2001) – Economy-wide model (CT)  
Claus and Thomas (2001) list a number of concerns about the dividend discount model, proposing a new 
measure of implied cost of equity based on a residual income valuation model.  
𝑃0 = 𝑏𝑣𝑝𝑠0 + ∑
𝐴𝐸𝑡
(1 + 𝑟𝐶𝑇)𝑡
5
𝑡=1
+
𝐴𝐸5(1 + 𝑔𝑎𝑒)
(𝑟𝐶𝑇 − 𝑔𝑎𝑒)(1 + 𝑟𝐶𝑇)5
 
 
C1 
 
where 𝐴𝐸𝑡 represents abnormal earnings in year t and are calculated as 𝐴𝐸𝑡 = 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 − 𝑟𝐶𝑇(𝑏𝑣𝑝𝑠𝑡−1), 𝐸𝑃𝑆 are 
earnings per share, 𝑏𝑣𝑝𝑠 is the book value per share, P0 is current price, and 𝑔𝑎𝑒 a long-term growth beyond 
period five, which is set equal to the forecasted inflation.  
 
2. Gebhardt et al. (2001) – Industry model (GLS)  
Gebhardt et al. (2001) model is similar to the Claus and Thomas (2001) economy-wide model, particularly in 
that both are residual income models. However, 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 differs from 𝑟𝐶𝑇  in two basic assumptions. First, the 
forecast period is based on 11 years, where the first 3 years use specific forecasts. For the remaining period it 
is assumed that firm return on equity (𝑅𝑂𝐸) will gradually fade to a target 𝑅𝑂𝐸. Secondly, 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 assumes zero 
growth in its terminal value. 
𝑃0 = 𝑏𝑣𝑝𝑠0 + ∑
(𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡 − 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆)𝑏𝑣𝑝𝑠𝑡−1
(1 + 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆)𝑡
11
𝑡=1
+
(𝑅𝑂𝐸12 − 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆)𝑏𝑣𝑝𝑠11
(1 + 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆)12
 
 
C2 
 
3. Gode and Mohanram (2003) – Modified economy-wide growth model (GM)  
This measure is an implementation of the economy-wide growth model by Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005).  
𝑟𝐺𝑀 = 𝐴 + √𝐴2 +
𝐸𝑃𝑆1
𝑃0
(𝑔𝑠𝑡 − 𝑔𝑎𝑒) 
 
C3 
where 𝐴 =
𝑔𝑎𝑒+
𝐷𝑃𝑆1
𝑃0
2
, 𝐷𝑃𝑆 is dividend per share and 𝑔𝑠𝑡 is a short-term growth. 𝑟𝐺𝑀 considers that short term 
growth can be set equal to 𝑔𝑠𝑡 =
𝐸𝑃𝑆2−𝐸𝑃𝑆1
2
. 
 
4. Easton (2004) – Modified price-earnings growth (PEG) models  
Easton (2004) builds on Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), assuming that market expects no growth in 
abnormal earnings used in the terminal value. 
𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺 = 𝐴 + √𝐴2 + (
𝐸𝑃𝑆2 − 𝐸𝑃𝑆1
𝑃0
) 
 
C4 
where 𝐴 =
𝐷𝑃𝑆1
2𝑃0
. Among the various measured proposed by Easton (2004), we employ 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺 , since it allows for 
dividend paid at 𝑡 = 1, while the other models assume no dividends.  
 
Further assumptions 
To estimate ICC we require each observation to have at least 1- and 2-year ahead EPS forecasts and price (P). 
We use analysts EPS forecasts, DPS forecasts, and long-term growth (LTG) forecasts from I/B/E/S, and stock 
prices (P) from Datastream. Many studies measure forecasted EPS, DPS, LTG and P in a range from +4 to +10 
months from financial year end t (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee 2005, Hail and Leuz 2006). To ensure regulatory 
filings are publicly available and reasonably priced (Frankel and Lee 1999), we consider mean analysts forecasts 
and prices as of month +5. Following Hail and Leuz (2006), we do not discount earnings or dividend forecasts, 
however we use (1 + 𝐼𝐶𝐶)−5/12 as a discount factor for P. bvps for 𝑡 = 0 is the ratio of equity book value to 
number of shares outstanding. For expected bvps from 𝑡 = 1 to 𝑡 = 11, we impose 𝑏𝑣𝑝𝑠𝑡 = 𝑏𝑣𝑝𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 −
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡  (c.f., Dhaliwal et al. 2007). In case of data unavailability, we use the following criteria. Unavailable EPS 
forecasts for 𝑡 = 3 to 𝑡 = 5 are estimated as 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝐿𝑇𝐺), when 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 > 0 (Claus and Thomas 2001, 
Dhaliwal et al. 2007). If 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 ≤ 0, we use 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝑘 = 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡(1 + 𝐿𝑇𝐺)
𝑘. To calculate a missing 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡  we use 
the firm’s dividend-pay-out ratio (DPR). We calculate forecasted 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡   as 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡 = 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 × 𝐷𝑃𝑅0 (Gode and 
Mohanram 2003, Dhaliwal et al. 2007). DPR0 is computed as the ratio of DPS to EPS, based on the average of 
three years preceding financial year end t. When DPR is missing or not falling in the range from 0 to 1, we 
replace it with the country-year median DPR (Hail and Leuz 2006). When LTG is not available, we estimate it 
as (𝐸𝑃𝑆2/𝐸𝑃𝑆1)  − 1 (Gode and Mohanram 2003). 
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Table 1 – Sample selection 
Panel A Sample selection process 
The sample selection process considers as a starting point all the S&P EU350 constituents from 31st December 
2008 to 31st December 2011 
1,400 starting observations [350 firms for 4 years (2008; 2009; 2010; and 2011)] 
n observations 
excluded thereafter 
Reason for exclusion 
291 classified as Financials (c.f., Hail 2002, Nikolaev and van Lent 2005) 
20 present twice in the S&P EU350 constituents a 
19 reporting under U.S. GAAP 
4 annual report not publicly available because the firms delisted before issuing it 
3 changed annual report ending period 
8 missing country controls for Luxembourg 
41 negative book value of equity 
183 goodwill to book value of equity below 5% 
831 final sample 
Panel B – Sample constituents by Country and Industry  
 ICB industry classificationb  
Country 
Basic 
mat. 
Cons. 
goods 
Cons. 
services 
Health 
care 
Indus- 
trials 
Oil and 
gas 
Tech-
nology 
Telec. Utilities TOT 
Austria 5 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 11 
Belgium 6 4 6 4 1 0 0 4 0 25 
Denmark 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 12 
Finland 4 0 0 0 11 0 4 0 0 19 
France 4 32 39 8 39 4 15 4 16 161 
Germany 16 20 11 8 20 0 6 4 8 93 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 
Ireland 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Italy 0 10 5 0 8 8 0 4 7 42 
Netherland 10 9 7 3 6 0 3 4 0 42 
Norway 5 4 0 0 0 2 0 4 0 15 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 4 2 0 4 4 14 
Spain 0 0 1 0 16 8 0 4 7 36 
Sweden 8 10 0 0 35 0 4 8 0 65 
Switzerland 12 6 0 14 6 0 0 4 0 42 
UK 17 40 68 12 57 7 16 10 19 246 
TOT 87 142 137 54 203 37 48 62 61 831 
a To avoid double counting, firms that are cross-listed in more than one European market are included in our 
sample once, based only on the country of primary listing. 
b Based on the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) Level 2.  
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics for mandatory disclosure levels 
Panel A – Descriptive statistics by year 
Statistics 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-2011 
Mean 0.778  0.819  0.857  0.840  0.823  
St. dev. 0.117  0.117  0.173  0.117  0.137  
Min 0.333  0.500  0.333  0.500  0.333  
Median 0.786  0.824  0.889  0.857  0.833  
Max 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
N 207 214 213 197 831 
Panel B – Test for trend 
Cuzick test a    6.280*** 
 
FOLLOW-UP TEST 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
Mann-Whitney a -3.583*** -4.592*** 3.215*** 
T-test a -3.613*** -2.617*** 1.115 
Panel C – Frequency by level of compliance and year  
Level 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-2011 
% n % n % n % n % n % 
31-40 1 0.5 0 0.0 6 2.8 0 0.0 7 0.8 
41-50 3 1.5 3 1.4 7 3.3 1 0.5 14 1.7 
51-60 10 4.8 10 4.7 9 4.2 5 2.5 34 4.1 
61-70 37 17.9 22 10.3 12 5.6 20 10.2 91 11.0 
71-80 59 28.5 46 21.5 31 14.6 35 17.8 171 20.6 
81-90 68 32.9 74 34.6 45 21.1 66 33.5 253 30.5 
91-100 29 14.0 59 27.6 103 48.4 70 35.5 261 31.4 
N 207 100.0 214 100.0 213 100.0 197 100.0 831 100.0 
Panel D – Mean (median) by country and year 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-2011 
Austria  0.746 (0.746)   0.854 (0.854)   0.863 (0.875)   0.736 (0.736)   0.807 (0.850)  
Belgium  0.740 (0.750)   0.732 (0.750)   0.676 (0.774)   0.738 (0.746)   0.722 (0.750)  
Denmark  0.839 (0.875)   0.917 (0.933)  0.923 (1.000)   0.952 (1.000)   0.908 (0.967)  
Finland  0.777 (0.774)   0.857 (0.875)   0.888 (0.857)   0.941 (1.000)   0.870 (0.867)  
France  0.735 (0.731)   0.754 (0.765)   0.777 (0.778)   0.755 (0.750)   0.755 (0.760)  
Germany  0.766 (0.765)   0.837 (0.861)   0.920 (1.000)   0.886 (0.909)   0.852 (0.875)  
Greece  0.727 (0.727)   0.769 (0.769)   1.000 (1.000)   0.579 (0.579)   0.769 (0.748)  
Ireland  0.857 (0.857)  0.952 (0.952) 1.000 (1.000) 0.950 (0.950) 0.940 (0.951) 
Italy  0.785 (0.782)   0.821 (0.810)   0.841 (0.857)   0.872 (0.882)   0.831 (0.823)  
Netherlands  0.800 (0.805)   0.792 (0.800)   0.873 (0.882)   0.863 (0.909)   0.833 (0.875)  
Norway  0.806 (0.811)   0.776 (0.800)   0.909 (1.000)   0.827 (0.824)   0.828 (0.815)  
Portugal  0.714 (0.706)   0.719 (0.769)   0.699 (0.746)   0.765 (0.794)   0.726 (0.767)  
Spain  0.676 (0.671)   0.743 (0.768)   0.717 (0.675)   0.797 (0.789)   0.738 (0.743)  
Sweden  0.787 (0.782)   0.822 (0.824)   0.921 (1.000)   0.880 (0.868)   0.848 (0.857)  
Switzerland  0.822 (0.824)   0.871 (0.894)   0.901 (0.969)   0.884 (0.900)   0.874 (0.889)  
UK  0.811 (0.842)   0.867 (0.889)   0.891 (1.000)   0.869 (0.889)   0.859 (0.882)  
Disclosure level is calculated as the ratio of the total items disclosed by a company to the maximum number of 
applicable items for that company (and with which compliance is expected). Disclosure lies between 0 and 1 
(see Eq.(1)).   
a Cuzick test is a non-parametric test for trend across ordered groups (see Cuzick 1985). Mann-Whitney and T-
test examine the median and mean differences between two periods respectively. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 3 – Paragraphs in IFRS 3 and IAS 36 for which high non-compliance is observed a 
Panel A – IFRS 3 Business combinations 
Paragraph Sub-paragraph 
# firms 
applicable 
(N) 
% firms 
that 
comply 
75 (before revision) – B67 (after revision) 
To give effect to the principle in paragraph 74 [An entity shall disclose 
information that enables users of its financial statements to evaluate 
changes in the carrying amount of goodwill during the period.], the entity 
shall disclose a reconciliation of the carrying amount of goodwill at the 
beginning and end of the period, showing separately: 
   
 75-a-i (before revision) – B67-d-i (after revision) 
the gross amount and accumulated impairment losses at the beginning 
of the period 
831 79.8% 
 75-a-viii (before revision) – B67-d-viii (after revision) 
the gross amount and accumulated impairment losses at the end of the 
period 
831 86.9% 
68 (before revision) – B65 (after revision) 
For individually immaterial business combinations occurring during the 
reporting period that are material collectively, the acquirer shall disclose 
in aggregate the information required by paragraph B64(e)–(q). 
   
 68-f (before revision) – B65-i (after revision) 
the amounts recognised as of the acquisition date for each major class 
of assets acquired and liabilities assumed. 
537 65.4% 
 68-h (before revision) 
a description of the factors that contributed to a cost that results in the 
recognition of goodwill—a description of each intangible asset that 
was not recognised separately from goodwill and an explanation of 
why the intangible asset’s fair value could not be measured reliably 
270 9.1% 
 B65-e (after revision) 
a qualitative description of the factors that make up the goodwill 
recognised, such as expected synergies from combining operations of 
the acquiree and the acquirer, intangible assets that do not qualify for 
separate recognition or other factors 
251 51.8% 
67 (before revision) – B64 (after revision) 
To meet the objective in paragraph 59 [The acquirer shall disclose 
information that enables users of its financial statements to evaluate the 
nature and financial effect of a business combination that occurs either: 
(a) during the current reporting period; or (b) after the end of the reporting 
67-f before revision) – B64-i (after revision) 
the amounts recognised as of the acquisition date for each major class 
of assets acquired and liabilities assumed 
146 88.4% 
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period but before the financial statements are authorised for issue], the 
acquirer shall disclose the following information for each business 
combination that occurs during the reporting period: 
Panel B – IAS 36 Impairment of Assets 
Paragraph Sub-paragraph 
# firms 
applicable 
(N) 
% firms 
that 
comply 
134 
An entity shall disclose the information required by (a)–(f) for each cash-
generating unit (group of units) for which the carrying amount of goodwill 
or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives allocated to that unit 
(group of units) is significant in comparison with the entity’s total 
carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful 
lives 
134-d 
if the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount is based on value in 
use 
  
 134-d-ii 
a description of management’s approach to determining the value(s) 
assigned to each key assumption, whether those value(s) reflect past 
experience or, if appropriate, are consistent with external sources of 
information, and, if not, how and why they differ from past experience 
or external sources of information 
771 61.4% 
 134-d-i 
a description of each key assumption on which management has based 
its cash flow projections for the period covered by the most recent 
budgets/forecasts. Key assumptions are those to which the unit’s 
(group of units’) recoverable amount is most sensitive 
771 71.2% 
 134-d-iii 
the period over which management has projected cash flows based on 
financial budgets/forecasts approved by management and, when a 
period greater than five years is used for a cash-generating unit (group 
of units), an explanation of why that longer period is justified 
771 85.3% 
129 
An entity that reports segment information in accordance with IFRS 8 
shall disclose the following for each reportable segment 
129-a 
the amount of impairment losses recognised in profit or loss and in 
other comprehensive income during the period 
248 70.8% 
131 
An entity shall disclose the following information for the aggregate 
impairment losses recognised during the period for which no information 
is disclosed in accordance with paragraph 130 
131-b 
the main events and circumstances that led to the recognition of these 
impairment losses  
177 39.0% 
134 
An entity shall disclose the information required by (a)–(f) for each cash-
generating unit (group of units) for which the carrying amount of goodwill 
134-e 
if the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount is based on fair value 
less costs to sell, the methodology used to determine fair value less 
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or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives allocated to that unit 
(group of units) is significant in comparison with the entity’s total 
carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful 
lives  
costs to sell. If fair value less costs to sell is not determined using an 
observable market price for the unit (group of units), the following 
information shall also be disclosed: 
  
 
134-e-ii 
a description of management’s approach to determining the value (or 
values) assigned to each key assumption, whether those values reflect 
past experience or, if appropriate, are consistent with external sources 
of information, and, if not, how and why they differ from past 
experience or external sources of information 
 
 
133 
 
 
58.3% 
 134-e-i 
a description of each key assumption on which management has based 
its determination of fair value less costs to sell. Key assumptions are 
those to which the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount is most 
sensitive 
133 83.5% 
134 
An entity shall disclose the information required by (a)–(f) for each cash-
generating unit (group of units) for which the carrying amount of goodwill 
or intangible assets with indefinite useful lives allocated to that unit 
(group of units) is significant in comparison with the entity’s total 
carrying amount of goodwill or intangible assets with indefinite useful 
lives  
134-f 
if a reasonably possible change in a key assumption on which 
management has based its determination of the unit’s (group of units’) 
recoverable amount would cause the unit’s (group of units’) carrying 
amount to exceed its recoverable amount 
  
 134-f-iii 
the amount by which the value assigned to the key assumption must 
change, after incorporating any consequential effects of that change on 
the other variables used to measure recoverable amount, in order for 
the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount to be equal to its 
carrying amount 
123 46.9% 
 134-f-i 
the amount by which the unit’s (group of units’) recoverable amount 
exceeds its carrying amount 
115 65.4% 
 134-f-ii 
the value assigned to the key assumption 
115 80.4% 
The table presents the mandatory paragraphs/items in IFRS 3 and IAS 36 for which mean compliance is less than 90% and the paragraph/item is applicable to more than 100 
firm-year observations (N). The first two columns describe the paragraph and sub-paragraph, respectively. The third column indicates the number of firms for which the 
paragraph/item is applicable, and the last column provides the percentage of firms for which the paragraph/item is applicable and they do comply. Paragraphs are listed according 
to the following criteria: i) descending order based on the number of firms they are applicable to; ii) ascending order based on the compliance level. 
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a In case some disclosure items were required in different paragraphs after the revision of IFRS3, we report the paragraph number both before revision and after revision. In 
such cases, we report the version under the revised version of the standard. 
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables 
Panel A – Firm and Country specific control variables 
Variable n Mean St. dev Min Median Max 
DiscSaidin 831 0.564 0.253 0.013 0.555 1.000 
DiscScaled 831 0.614 0.556 0.000 0.467 2.000 
DiscRaw 831 0.275 0.179 0.000 0.257 0.667 
GdwBV 831 0.699 0.894 0.050 0.507 16.900 
PageCount 831 200 89 54 179 620 
AWCA 831 0.026 0.032 0.000 0.017 0.289 
ROA 831 0.048 0.061 -0.786 0.044 0.356 
M2B 831 2.673 3.365 0.191 1.935 43.806 
Leverage 831 1.153 1.657 0.000 0.710 28.419 
MV 831 15,639 21,365 240 7,279 148,083 
rVar 831 0.011 0.015 0.000 0.007 0.199 
Dispersion 831 0.999 2.222 0.000 0.290 27.370 
MrktDev 831 0.769 0.458 0.113 0.692 2.322 
Enforcement 831 18 4 8 21 22 
Panel B – Dependent variable implied cost of equity 𝒓𝑨𝑽 
Statistics 2008 2009 2010 2011 2008-2011 
Mean 0.111 0.109 0.105 0.118 0.111 
St. dev. 0.041 0.038 0.032 0.048 0.040 
Min 0.010 0.010 0.017 0.017 0.010 
Median 0.106 0.107 0.104 0.109 0.106 
Max 0.317 0.324 0.253 0.302 0.324 
N 207 214 213 197 831 
Panel C – Test for trend in implied cost of equity 𝒓𝑨𝑽 
Cuzick test a   0.930 
Follow-up Tests 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
Mann-Whitney a 0.067 0.903 -2.267** 
T-test a 0.366 1.125 -3.359*** 
Panel D – Pearson’s correlation coefficients for implied cost of equity 
 𝑟𝐶𝑇  𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 𝑟𝐺𝑀 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  𝑟𝐴𝑉 
𝑟𝐶𝑇  1     
𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 0.629*** 1    
𝑟𝐺𝑀 0.429*** 0.369*** 1   
𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  0.488*** 0.544*** 0.547*** 1  
𝑟𝐴𝑉 0.755*** 0.818*** 0.753*** 0.871*** 1 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the independent variables. DiscSaidin is a disclosure score which weights 
each disclosure item by the percentage of firms in the sample that do not comply with the item (Hodgdon et al., 
2008). DiscScaled and DiscRaw are transformations of actual mandatory disclosure levels (Francis et al., 2005). 
DiscRaw is the difference between a firm’s disclosure and the country-minimum score the firm is incorporated in. 
DiscScaled is DiscRaw scaled by the country-minimum score. GdwBV is goodwill (GDW from Compustat) to book 
value of equity (WC03501). PageCount is the number of pages of each annual report. This is used for computing 
the Readability measure employed in the subsequent analyses (ln(PageCount)). AWCA is the absolute value of 
abnormal working capital accruals scaled by the end-of-the-year total assets (DeFond and Park 2001). AWCA = 
(WCt – WCt-1*St / St-1) / TAt. WC stands for working capital accruals, computed as current assets (WC02201) – cash 
& equivalents (WC02001) – current liabilities (WC03101) + short term debt (WC03051). 𝑆 and TA stand for sales 
and total assets (WC02999), respectively. ROA is return on assets calculated as the ratio between net income and 
total assets (WC01751 / WC02999). M2B is the market value to book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio between 
total debt and book value of equity (WC03255/WC03501). MV is market value (€ millions; WC08001). MV is used 
for computing the Size variable employed in the subsequent analyses (ln(MV)). rVar is the return variance over the 
financial year. All accounting and market data refer to year t = 0. Dispersion is the standard deviation of the last 
forecast before earnings announcement. MrktDev is the market capitalisation of listed companies as a % of GDP. 
Enforcement is an index capturing the strength of the enforcement body in each country (Brown et al., 2014). Panel 
B reports descriptive statistics for the implied cost of equity proxy (ICC) used, 𝑟𝐴𝑉, which is a simple average 
measure of the 𝑟𝐶𝑇  (Claus and Thomas 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 (Gebhardt et al. 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝑀 (Gode and Mohanran 2003), 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  
(Easton 2004). Further information about the ICC models can be found in Appendices B and C. Panel C tests for 
trend in ICC and Panel D presents Pearson correlations among the ICC calculated. 
a Cuzick test is a non-parametric test for trend across ordered groups (see Cuzick 1985). Mann-Whitney and T-test 
examine the median and mean differences between two periods respectively. 
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*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 5 – Pearson’s correlation coefficients 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) rAV a 1       
(2) DiscSaidin -0.103*** 1      
(3) DiscScaled -0.141*** 0.305*** 1     
(4) DiscRaw -0.139*** 0.472*** 0.948*** 1    
(5) GdwBV a -0.033 -0.005 0.148*** 0.168*** 1   
(6) Readability -0.143*** 0.115*** 0.078** 0.057 0.010 1  
(7) AWCA a 0.071** 0.082** -0.021 -0.017 -0.123*** 0.040 1 
(8) ROA a -0.339*** 0.007 -0.008 -0.031 -0.087** 0.256*** -0.098*** 
(9) M2B a -0.282*** 0.082** 0.018 0.005 0.215*** 0.251*** 0.042 
(10) Leverage a 0.086** 0.039 0.004 0.011 0.362*** -0.145*** 0.093*** 
(11) Size -0.209*** -0.088** -0.071** -0.039 -0.121*** -0.256*** -0.161*** 
(12) rVar 0.119*** 0.005 -0.020 -0.034 -0.043 -0.027 0.188*** 
(13) Dispersion a -0.047 0.111*** 0.205*** 0.190*** -0.009 0.243*** 0.055 
(14) MrktDev -0.203*** 0.166*** 0.233*** 0.235*** 0.006 0.256*** 0.001 
(15) Enforcement -0.192*** 0.174*** 0.216*** 0.206*** 0.075** 0.081** 0.024 
 
(continued on next page) 
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  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(8) ROA a 1        
(9) M2B a 0.526*** 1       
(10) Leverage a -0.161*** 0.301*** 1      
(11) Size 0.181*** 0.074** -0.067* 1     
(12) rVar -0.269*** -0.197*** 0.023 -0.300*** 1    
(13) Dispersion a 0.078** 0.114*** 0.048 -0.072** 0.020 1   
(14) MrktDev 0.234*** 0.278*** -0.070** 0.015 -0.134*** 0.249*** 1  
(15) Enforcement 0.083** 0.136*** -0.088** 0.037 0.027 0.246*** 0.235*** 1 
This table reports Pearson’s correlation coefficients regarding all variables used in the main analyses. 𝑟𝐴𝑉 refers to implied cost of equity capital (ICC), calculated as simple 
average of 𝑟𝐶𝑇  (Claus and Thomas 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 (Gebhardt et al. 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝑀 (Gode and Mohanran 2003), 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  (Easton 2004). Further information about the ICC models can be 
found in Appendices B and C. DiscSaidin is a disclosure score which weights each disclosure item by the percentage of firms in the sample that do not comply with the item 
(Hodgdon et al., 2008). DiscScaled and DiscRaw are transformations of actual mandatory disclosure levels (Francis et al., 2005). DiscRaw is the difference between a firm’s 
disclosure and the country-minimum score the firm is incorporated in. DiscScaled is DiscRaw scaled by the country-minimum score. GdwBV is goodwill (GDW from 
Compustat) to book value of equity (WC03501). Readability is the natural logarithm of page number in the annual report (PageCount; see Table 4) multiplied by -1 (Lawrence 
2013). AWCA is the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by the end-of-the-year total assets (DeFond and Park 2001). AWCA = (WCt – WCt-1*St / St-1) / 
TAt. WC stands for working capital accruals, computed as current assets (WC02201) – cash & equivalents (WC02001) – current liabilities (WC03101) + short term debt 
(WC03051). 𝑆 and TA stand for sales and total assets (WC02999), respectively. ROA is return on assets calculated as the ratio between net income and total assets (WC01751 
/ WC02999). M2B is the market value to book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and book value of equity (WC03255/WC03501). Size is the natural 
logarithm of market value (Worldscope item WC08001; see Table 4). rVar is the return variance over the financial year. All accounting and market data refer to year t = 0. 
Dispersion is the standard deviation of the last forecast before earnings announcement. MrktDev is the market capitalisation of listed companies as a % of GDP. Enforcement 
is an index capturing the strength of the enforcement body in each country (Brown et al., 2014). 
a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 6 – Descriptive statistics when splitting the sample into firms that meet (MrktMet = 1) or not (MrktMet = 0) market expectations 
with regard to recognition of goodwill impairment loss. 
 MrktMet=0 MrktMet=1 Tests for difference 
Variable N Mean StDev Median N Mean StDev Median T-test 
MannWhitney 
test 
𝑟𝐴𝑉 248 0.115 0.043 0.112 583 0.108 0.039 0.104 2.248** 2.955*** 
DiscSaidin 248 0.553 0.218 0.551 583 0.569 0.267 0.555 -0.791 -0.327 
DiscScaled 248 0.471 0.390 0.391 583 0.675 0.603 0.500 -4.922*** -3.535*** 
DiscRaw 248 0.233 0.141 0.231 583 0.293 0.190 0.278 -4.487*** -4.002*** 
GdwBV 248 0.735 1.159 0.555 583 0.684 0.754 0.501 0.753 1.106 
MaterialIL 248 0.270 0.445 0.000 583 0.009 0.092 0.000 13.537*** 12.258*** 
MaterialBC 248 0.770 0.422 1.000 583 0.703 0.457 1.000 1.975** 1.971** 
Readability 248 -5.247 0.453 -5.252 583 -5.193 0.410 -5.170 -1.668** -1.393 
AWCA a 248 0.029 0.038 0.016 583 0.025 0.029 0.017 1.867** 0.163 
ROA a 248 0.030 0.071 0.031 583 0.055 0.054 0.050 -5.715*** -6.394*** 
M2B a 248 2.241 3.470 1.545 583 2.857 3.305 2.110 -2.422*** -5.175*** 
Leverage a 248 1.253 1.703 0.742 583 1.111 1.637 0.699 1.127 1.673* 
Size 248 9.075 1.173 9.037 583 8.969 1.119 8.865 1.234 1.437 
rVar 248 0.014 0.018 0.009 583 0.010 0.013 0.006 3.822*** 5.020*** 
Dispersion a 248 0.908 2.284 0.250 583 1.038 2.196 0.320 -0.722 -1.833* 
MrktDev 248 0.681 0.374 0.566 583 0.807 0.485 0.703 -3.664*** -3.368*** 
Enforcement 248 18 4 19 583 19 4 21 -2.179*** -2.927*** 
The table reports descriptive statistics when splitting the sample into firms that meet (MrktMet = 1) or not (MrktMet = 0) market expectations with regard to recognition of 
goodwill impairment loss. We categorise firms following Ramanna and Watts (2012). 𝑟𝐴𝑉 refers to implied cost of equity capital (ICC), calculated as simple average of 𝑟𝐶𝑇  
(Claus and Thomas 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 (Gebhardt et al. 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝑀 (Gode and Mohanran 2003), 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  (Easton 2004). DiscSaidin is a disclosure score that weights each disclosure 
item by the percentage of firms in the sample that do not comply with the item (Hodgdon et al., 2008). DiscScaled and DiscRaw are transformations of actual mandatory 
disclosure levels (Francis et al., 2005). DiscRaw is the difference between a firm’s disclosure and the country-minimum score the firm is incorporated in. DiscScaled is 
DiscRaw scaled by the country-minimum score. GdwBV is goodwill (GDW from Compustat) to book value of equity (WC03501). MaterialIL stands for material impairment 
loss and MaterialBC for material business combination. Readability is the natural logarithm of page number in the annual report (PageCount; see Table 4) multiplied by -1 
(Lawrence 2013). AWCA is the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by the end-of-the-year total assets (DeFond and Park 2001). AWCA = (WCt – WCt-
1*St / St-1) / TAt. WC stands for working capital accruals, computed as current assets (WC02201) – cash & equivalents (WC02001) – current liabilities (WC03101) + short term 
debt (WC03051). 𝑆 and TA stand for sales and total assets (WC02999), respectively. ROA is return on assets calculated as the ratio between net income and total assets 
(WC01751 / WC02999). M2B is the market value to book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and book value of equity (WC03255/WC03501). Size is the 
natural logarithm of market value (Worldscope item WC08001; see Table 4). rVar is the return variance over the financial year. All accounting and market data refer to year 
t = 0. Dispersion is the standard deviation of the last forecast before earnings announcement. MrktDev is the market capitalisation of listed companies as a % of GDP. 
Enforcement is an index capturing the strength of the enforcement body (Brown et al., 2014).  
a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles.*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 7 – Regression results for full sample and splitting the sample across firms meeting the market expectations 
VARIABLES Full Sample MrktMet=0 MrktMet=1 
Constant 
0.166*** 
(5.74) 
0.156*** 
(5.58) 
0.157*** 
(5.59) 
0.172*** 
(4.23) 
0.171*** 
(4.49) 
0.169*** 
(4.39) 
0.177*** 
(5.35) 
0.164*** 
(5.13) 
0.164*** 
(5.14) 
DiscSaidin 
-0.011** 
(-2.07)   
-0.016** 
(-2.31)   
-0.014 
(-1.30)   
DiscScaled 
 
-0.007** 
(-2.37)   
-0.022*** 
(-3.02)   
-0.005 
(-1.25)  
DiscRaw 
  
-0.020** 
(-2.37)   
-0.054*** 
(-2.65)   
-0.017 
(-1.37) 
GdwBV a 
-0.001 
(-0.65) 
-0.001 
(-0.50) 
-0.001 
(-0.45) 
0.003 
(1.42) 
0.003* 
(1.83) 
0.003* 
(1.91) 
-0.004* 
(-1.66) 
-0.003 
(-1.46) 
-0.003 
(-1.42) 
Readability 
-0.007* 
(-1.83) 
-0.007* 
(-1.74) 
-0.007* 
(-1.74) 
-0.008 
(-1.31) 
-0.008 
(-1.43) 
-0.008 
(-1.40) 
-0.005 
(-0.97) 
-0.006 
(-1.17) 
-0.006 
(-1.18) 
AWCA a 
0.053 
(1.09) 
0.048 
(0.96) 
0.049 
(0.98) 
0.209** 
(2.35) 
0.197** 
(2.25) 
0.199** 
(2.27) 
-0.025 
(-0.41) 
-0.032 
(-0.50) 
-0.031 
(-0.48) 
ROA a 
-0.139*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.141*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.142*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.208*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.235*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.237*** 
(-3.40) 
-0.110** 
(-1.98) 
-0.114** 
(-2.02) 
-0.114** 
(-2.02) 
M2B a 
-0.002 
(-1.35) 
-0.002 
(-1.43) 
-0.002 
(-1.46) 
-0.005 
(-1.62) 
-0.005* 
(-1.68) 
-0.005* 
(-1.69) 
-0.002 
(-1.10) 
-0.002 
(-1.11) 
-0.002 
(-1.14) 
Leverage a 
0.002 
(0.72) 
0.001 
(0.61) 
0.002 
(0.63) 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
-0.002 
(-0.49) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
0.003 
(0.89) 
0.002 
(0.71) 
0.002 
(0.73) 
Size 
-0.007*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.007*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.006*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.008** 
(-2.32) 
-0.008** 
(-2.43) 
-0.007** 
(-2.35) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.89) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.74) 
rVar 
-0.013 
(-0.13) 
-0.020 
(-0.22) 
-0.023 
(-0.25) 
-0.082 
(-0.65) 
-0.069 
(-0.60) 
-0.079 
(-0.66) 
0.019 
(0.14) 
0.018 
(0.13) 
0.015 
(0.11) 
Dispersion a 
0.001 
(1.09) 
0.001 
(1.22) 
0.001 
(1.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
0.001 
(0.33) 
0.001 
(0.26) 
0.001 
(1.03) 
0.001 
(1.13) 
0.001 
(1.12) 
MrktDev 
-0.014** 
(-2.52) 
-0.011** 
(-2.13) 
-0.011** 
(-2.13) 
-0.023** 
(-2.30) 
-0.013 
(-1.41) 
-0.015 
(-1.60) 
-0.012** 
(-2.13) 
-0.012** 
(-2.03) 
-0.012** 
(-1.97) 
Enforcement 
-0.001* 
(-1.77) 
-0.001* 
(-1.77) 
-0.001* 
(-1.77) 
-0.001 
(-0.84) 
-0.001 
(-0.90) 
-0.001 
(-0.90) 
-0.001** 
(-2.00) 
-0.001** 
(-2.02) 
-0.001** 
(-2.02) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 831 831 831 248 248 248 583 583 583 
F 4.27*** 4.38*** 4.39*** 4.27*** 4.50*** 4.51*** 4.82*** 4.69*** 4.69*** 
R2-adj 0.214 0.216 0.217 0.266 0.296 0.290 0.190 0.183 0.183 
Mean VIF 1.73 1.77 1.76 1.71 1.74 1.72 1.81 1.86 1.85 
This table reports the results of the OLS multivariate analyses after splitting the sample into firms that meet the market expectation (MrktMet = 1) with regard to recognition of goodwill 
impairment loss and firms that do not meet the market expectation (MrktMet = 0). We categorise firms following Ramanna and Watts (2012). 𝑟𝐴𝑉 refers to implied cost of equity capital (ICC), 
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calculated as simple average of 𝑟𝐶𝑇  (Claus and Thomas 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 (Gebhardt et al. 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝑀 (Gode and Mohanran 2003), 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  (Easton 2004). Further information about the ICC models can 
be found in Appendix C. DiscSaidin is a disclosure score which weights each disclosure item by the percentage of firms in the sample that do not comply with the item (Hodgdon et al., 2008). 
DiscScaled and DiscRaw are transformations of actual mandatory disclosure levels (Francis et al., 2005). DiscRaw is the difference between a firm’s disclosure and the country-minimum score 
the firm is incorporated in. DiscScaled is DiscRaw scaled by the country-minimum score. GdwBV is goodwill (GDW from Compustat) to book value of equity (WC03501). Readability is the 
natural logarithm of page number in the annual report (PageCount; see Table 4) multiplied by -1 (Lawrence 2013). AWCA is the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by 
the end-of-the-year total assets (DeFond and Park 2001). AWCA = (WCt – WCt-1*St / St-1) / TAt. WC stands for working capital accruals, computed as current assets (WC02201) – cash & 
equivalents (WC02001) – current liabilities (WC03101) + short term debt (WC03051). 𝑆 and TA stand for sales and total assets (WC02999), respectively. ROA is return on assets calculated as 
the ratio between net income and total assets (WC01751 / WC02999). M2B is the market value to book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and book value of equity 
(WC03255/WC03501). Size is the natural logarithm of market value (Worldscope item WC08001; see Table 4). rVar is the return variance over the financial year. All accounting and market 
data refer to year t = 0.  Dispersion is the standard deviation of the last forecast before earnings announcement. MrktDev is the market capitalisation of listed companies as a % of GDP. 
Enforcement is an index capturing the strength of the enforcement body in each country (Brown et al., 2014). 
a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 8 – Regression results splitting the sample across firms operating in countries with high and low enforcement 
VARIABLES EnfHL=0 EnfHL=1 
Constant 
0.175*** 
(5.37) 
0.171*** 
(5.32) 
0.172*** 
(5.40) 
0.242*** 
(4.50) 
0.240*** 
(4.54) 
0.243*** 
(4.65) 
DiscSaidin 
-0.002 
(-0.27) 
  -0.013* 
(-1.95) 
  
DiscScaled 
 -0.003 
(-0.54) 
  -0.010*** 
(-2.74) 
 
DiscRaw 
  -0.007 
(-0.54) 
  -0.029*** 
(-2.73) 
GdwBV a 
0.005 
(0.80) 
0.005 
(0.86) 
0.006 
(0.88) 
-0.001 
(-0.41) 
-0.001 
(-0.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
Readability 
0.002 
(0.45) 
0.002 
(0.39) 
0.002 
(0.38) 
-0.009 
(-1.50) 
-0.008 
(-1.34) 
-0.008 
(-1.35) 
AWCA a 
0.172** 
(2.63) 
0.175*** 
(2.68) 
0.174*** 
(2.67) 
0.034 
(0.62) 
0.030 
(0.52) 
0.031 
(0.54) 
ROA a 
-0.159** 
(-2.33) 
-0.159** 
(-2.37) 
-0.160** 
(-2.37) 
-0.129** 
(-2.32) 
-0.130** 
(-2.40) 
-0.132** 
(-2.41) 
M2B a 
-0.011*** 
(-4.72) 
-0.011*** 
(-4.77) 
-0.011*** 
(-4.79) 
0.001 
(0.25) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
Leverage a 
0.004 
(1.11) 
0.003 
(1.03) 
0.003 
(1.03) 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
-0.001 
(-0.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.32) 
Size 
-0.002 
(-0.61) 
-0.002 
(-0.61) 
-0.002 
(-0.61) 
-0.007*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.007*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.007*** 
(-2.87) 
rVar 
0.402* 
(1.70) 
0.401* 
(1.71) 
0.404* 
(1.71) 
-0.064 
(-0.72) 
-0.072 
(-0.85) 
-0.077 
(-0.89) 
Dispersion a 
0.001 
(0.17) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
0.002 
(1.31) 
0.002 
(1.53) 
0.002 
(1.50) 
MrktDev 
-0.009 
(-1.11) 
-0.008 
(-1.03) 
-0.008 
(-0.94) 
-0.016** 
(-2.56) 
-0.012** 
(-2.04) 
-0.012** 
(-2.12) 
Enforcement 
-0.001 
(-0.35) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
-0.005** 
(-2.53) 
-0.005** 
(-2.43) 
-0.005** 
(-2.53) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 306 306 306 525 525 525 
F 7.40*** 7.59*** 7.42*** 4.70*** 4.89*** 4.84*** 
R2-adj 0.376 0.376 0.377 0.216 0.223 0.224 
Mean VIF 2.23 2.27 2.25 1.77 1.84 1.81 
This table reports the OLS results of the multivariate analyses after splitting the sample into firms operating in countries with a level of enforcement equal to or above the country sample median 
enforcement (EnfHL = 1) and below sample median enforcement (EnfHL = 0) according to the enforcement measure developed by Brown et al. (2014). 𝑟𝐴𝑉  refers to implied cost of equity 
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capital (ICC), calculated as simple average of 𝑟𝐶𝑇  (Claus and Thomas 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 (Gebhardt et al. 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝑀 (Gode and Mohanran 2003), 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  (Easton 2004). Further information about the 
ICC models can be found in Appendices B and C. DiscSaidin is a disclosure score which weights each disclosure item by the percentage of firms in the sample that do not comply with the item 
(Hodgdon et al., 2008). DiscScaled and DiscRaw are transformations of actual mandatory disclosure levels (Francis et al., 2005). DiscRaw is the difference between a firm’s disclosure and the 
country-minimum score the firm is incorporated in. DiscScaled is DiscRaw scaled by the country-minimum score. GdwBV is goodwill (GDW from Compustat) to book value of equity 
(WC03501). Readability is the natural logarithm of page number in the annual report (PageCount; see Table 4) multiplied by -1 (Lawrence 2013). AWCA is the absolute value of abnormal 
working capital accruals scaled by the end-of-the-year total assets (DeFond and Park 2001). AWCA = (WCt – WCt-1*St / St-1) / TAt. WC stands for working capital accruals, computed as current 
assets (WC02201) – cash & equivalents (WC02001) – current liabilities (WC03101) + short term debt (WC03051). 𝑆 and TA stand for sales and total assets (WC02999), respectively. ROA is 
return on assets calculated as the ratio between net income and total assets (WC01751 / WC02999). M2B is the market value to book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio between total debt 
and book value of equity (WC03255/WC03501). Size is the natural logarithm of market value (Worldscope item WC08001; see Table 4). rVar is the return variance over the financial year. All 
accounting and market data refer to year t = 0.  Dispersion is the standard deviation of the last forecast before earnings announcement. MrktDev is the market capitalisation of listed companies 
as a % of GDP. Enforcement is an index capturing the strength of the enforcement body in each country (Brown et al., 2014). 
a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 9 – Regression results splitting the sample across firms operating in countries with high and low enforcement and firms meeting 
the market expectations 
VARIABLES 
EnfHL=0 EnfHL=1 
MrktMet=0 MrktMet=1 MrktMet=0 MrktMet=1 
Constant 
0.136*** 
(3.67) 
0.145*** 
(3.79) 
0.145*** 
(3.82) 
0.198*** 
(4.97) 
0.173*** 
(4.58) 
0.173*** 
(4.60) 
0.309*** 
(2.88) 
0.314*** 
(2.99) 
0.318*** 
(3.10) 
0.256*** 
(4.44) 
0.254*** 
(4.42) 
0.255*** 
(4.47) 
DiscSaidin 
0.012 
(0.77) 
  -0.013 
(-1.26) 
  -0.018** 
(-2.08) 
  -0.011 
(-1.51) 
  
DiscScaled 
 -0.004 
(-0.27) 
  -0.002 
(-0.46) 
  -0.027*** 
(-3.02) 
  -0.005 
(-1.39) 
 
DiscRaw 
  -0.006 
(-0.23) 
  -0.010 
(-0.65) 
  -0.077*** 
(-2.72) 
  -0.015 
(-1.37) 
GdwBV a 
0.013 
(1.50) 
0.015 
(1.55) 
0.015 
(1.55) 
0.002 
(0.32) 
0.003 
(0.41) 
0.003 
(0.44) 
0.002 
(0.98) 
0.002 
(1.35) 
0.003 
(1.49) 
-0.002 
(-1.13) 
-0.002 
(-0.88) 
-0.002 
(-0.86) 
Readability 
-0.002 
(-0.23) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.035*** 
(4.02) 
0.032*** 
(3.68) 
0.032*** 
(3.73) 
-0.021*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.016** 
(-2.37) 
-0.015** 
(-2.01) 
0.005 
(0.23) 
0.004 
(0.21) 
0.004 
(0.19) 
AWCA a 
0.001 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
0.007 
(1.07) 
0.005 
(0.71) 
0.005 
(0.70) 
-0.008 
(-0.66) 
-0.007 
(-0.53) 
-0.006 
(-0.51) 
-0.007 
(-1.04) 
-0.006 
(-0.89) 
-0.006 
(-0.91) 
ROA a 
0.338* 
(1.96) 
0.336* 
(1.98) 
0.335* 
(1.98) 
0.110 
(1.39) 
0.119 
(1.54) 
0.121 
(1.57) 
0.148 
(1.29) 
0.152 
(1.34) 
0.146 
(1.29) 
-0.032 
(-0.50) 
-0.039 
(-0.59) 
-0.038 
(-0.58) 
M2B a 
-0.361*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.352*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.351*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.081 
(-1.23) 
-0.067 
(-1.02) 
-0.069 
(-1.05) 
-0.187* 
(-1.84) 
-0.190* 
(-1.89) 
-0.204** 
(-2.03) 
-0.131* 
(-1.95) 
-0.134** 
(-2.01) 
-0.134** 
(-2.00) 
Leverage a 
-0.013*** 
(-3.07) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.98) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.99) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
0.001 
(0.23) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
Size 
-0.002 
(-0.43) 
-0.003 
(-0.48) 
-0.003 
(-0.47) 
0.005 
(1.14) 
0.004 
(0.96) 
0.004 
(0.96) 
-0.008 
(-1.59) 
-0.008* 
(-1.79) 
-0.008* 
(-1.68) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
rVar 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.20) 
-0.010** 
(-2.34) 
-0.010** 
(-2.46) 
-0.009** 
(-2.34) 
-0.007*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.75) 
-0.006*** 
(-2.70) 
Dispersion a 
0.960* 
(1.94) 
0.987* 
(1.91) 
0.986* 
(1.91) 
0.428 
(1.57) 
0.401 
(1.53) 
0.403 
(1.53) 
-0.066 
(-0.41) 
-0.064 
(-0.50) 
-0.058 
(-0.44) 
-0.067 
(-0.53) 
-0.063 
(-0.50) 
-0.069 
(-0.55) 
MrktDev 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.001 
(0.23) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
0.001 
(0.45) 
0.002 
(0.92) 
0.002 
(0.89) 
0.002 
(1.33) 
0.002 
(1.46) 
0.002 
(1.43) 
Enforcement 
-0.007 
(-0.36) 
-0.004 
(-0.16) 
-0.004 
(-0.18) 
-0.016 
(-1.63) 
-0.017 
(-1.64) 
-0.016 
(-1.49) 
-0.023 
(-1.63) 
-0.013 
(-0.97) 
-0.015 
(-1.15) 
-0.014** 
(-2.14) 
-0.012* 
(-1.92) 
-0.013** 
(-1.98) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 110 110 110 196 196 196 138 138 138 387 387 387 
F 5.496 5.811 5.777 4.630 4.481 4.351 9.496 9.654 6.413 6.136 6.096 6.064 
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R2-adj 0.479 0.476 0.476 0.346 0.338 0.339 0.266 0.324 0.318 0.185 0.184 0.184 
Mean VIF 3.32 3.36 3.34 2.19 2.21 2.19 1.79 1.83 1.81 1.87 1.93 1.91 
This table reports the results of the OLS multivariate analyses after splitting the sample into four clusters. First we split the sample into firms operating in countries with a level of enforcement 
equal to or above the country sample median enforcement (EnfHL = 1) and below sample median enforcement (EnfHL = 0) according to the enforcement measure developed by Brown et al. 
(2014). Second, we divide firms that meet the market expectation (MrktMet = 1) with regard to recognition of goodwill impairment loss and firms that do not meet the market expectation 
(MrktMet = 0). We categorise firms following Ramanna and Watts (2012). 𝑟𝐴𝑉 refers to implied cost of equity capital (ICC), calculated as simple average of 𝑟𝐶𝑇  (Claus and Thomas 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆 
(Gebhardt et al. 2001), 𝑟𝐺𝑀 (Gode and Mohanran 2003), 𝑟𝑀𝑃𝐸𝐺  (Easton 2004). Further information about the ICC models can be found in Appendices B and C. DiscSaidin is a disclosure score 
which weights each disclosure item by the percentage of firms in the sample that do not comply with the item (Hodgdon et al., 2008). DiscScaled and DiscRaw are transformations of actual 
mandatory disclosure levels (Francis et al., 2005). DiscRaw is the difference between a firm’s disclosure and the country-minimum score the firm is incorporated in. DiscScaled is DiscRaw 
scaled by the country-minimum score. GdwBV is goodwill (GDW from Compustat) to book value of equity (WC03501). Readability is the natural logarithm of page number in the annual report 
(PageCount; see Table 4) multiplied by -1 (Lawrence 2013). AWCA is the absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals scaled by the end-of-the-year total assets (DeFond and Park 
2001). AWCA = (WCt – WCt-1*St / St-1) / TAt. WC stands for working capital accruals, computed as current assets (WC02201) – cash & equivalents (WC02001) – current liabilities (WC03101) 
+ short term debt (WC03051). 𝑆 and TA stand for sales and total assets (WC02999), respectively. ROA is return on assets calculated as the ratio between net income and total assets (WC01751 
/ WC02999). M2B is the market value to book value of equity. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and book value of equity (WC03255/WC03501). Size is the natural logarithm of market 
value (Worldscope item WC08001; see Table 4). rVar is the return variance over the financial year. All accounting and market data refer to year t = 0.  Dispersion is the standard deviation of 
the last forecast before earnings announcement. MrktDev is the market capitalisation of listed companies as a % of GDP. Enforcement is an index capturing the strength of the enforcement body 
in each country (Brown et al., 2014). 
a Variables winsorised at the 2nd and 98th percentiles. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
